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Introduction

In this article we are attempting to analyze one of the most celebrated secular intellectuals (Anthony Giddens) from England who has been considered as one of the classics of post-modern social theory. To engage with Giddens would be of great significance for anyone who is interested in intercivilizational dialogue between Islam (as a civilization as well as an intellectual tradition) and secularism (as a world order as well as an intellectual tradition). In this article I would like mainly focus on metaphysical dimensions of his social theory which have been less pondered upon generally and by Muslim intellectuals in particular. By the metaphysics I don't mean the theological significance of his theory but how the absence of these concerns have created a chaos of meaning within secular tradition in generally and in Giddens' work in particular as theological concerns are not only of abstract significance but of profound praxiological import which without the constitution of self and society would lose the canopy of meaning in an integral sense which connects now to eternity or Man to God. I have certain few questions which I would like to pose and construe my dialogical approach with Giddens through these questions. The questions are as follow:

Does Giddens' sociology contain any notion of authentic extra-Occidental civilizational unit? Does Giddens' sociology go beyond monological civilizational understanding? What are the parameters of Giddens' historical vision? Where does his sociology lie in terms of meta-theory?

In order to address these issues I have chosen two of his works which are of relevance to my questions: *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory* (1971), *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism I, II, III* (1981, 1985, 1994[†]). However this does not mean that I have excluded other books or articles written by Giddens. I have used other works whenever I have seen they would shed some light on my questions and additionally would be enlightening in regard to my points. In other words, I have followed his works up to recent.

Why is Giddens significant for an inter-civilizational sociological project?

It would be more constructive to say a few words about my choice of Giddens before going any further in discussing his social theoretical views. Why is Giddens important? What is there in his sociological quest, which deems him a significant figure in contemporary context?

As early as 1970 by his work 'Western Sociology' Gouldner came to argue that sociology is in crisis and the critical mode is impending upon modern contemporary secular social theory. This was a fact that was discerned by a progressive a sociologist such as Alvin Gouldner. He forcefully attempted to document the

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[†] It is important to mention that Giddens never wrote the third volume but this work was based on the ideas he sketched for the third volume and other issues. (See Giddens' preface 1994)

anatomy of sociological crisis and sincerely put forward his own remedy called: reflexive sociology.

Although not at the same time nevertheless around the same period and within the similar culture of science, another sociologist from Britain embarked on the same reconstructive project. This sociologist was no one less than Anthony Giddens. The anatomy of crisis were laid bare by Gouldner in 1970 but Giddensian 'rescue mission' did not await longer than 1971 by ecumenical reinterpretation of 'Classical Trio' and a re-writing of sociological rules in 1976.

In other words, by the middle of seventies, it became clear, at least for post-Marxist-Revisionist sociologists, that Giddens, if not 'The Man' but definitely, is one of the men who can rescue the western sociology from impending crisis. And by that latter understanding one did not mean that Giddens is the chosen sociologist to rescue the narrow academic disciplinary sociology. The proponents of Giddensian project had a wider understanding of sociology and its mission. For them, sociology was a society's understanding of itself, and the disciplinary sociology along other disciplinary approaches to the 'Social' did represent this broad societal self-conception. (Mann, 1983, p.v.)

In other words, the proponents of Giddens did not think of him as another disciplinary teacher. On the contrary, he was going to be considered, by sociologists such as John Urry as early as 1977, as the saviour of western sociology. In Urry's own words,

"If western sociology is to be saved from its continuing crisis, Anthony Giddens may be the author to achieve it ..." (1977. 911).

And another sociologist, John Rex, as early as 1983 considered the Giddensian project as an attempt to reconceptualize the whole edifice of classical sociological reasoning in terms of what he called *philosophization of sociology*. In Rex' own words,

Giddens began to draw on ... existentialism, structuralism, European Marxism and critical theory, ... and as well as on his own wide and erudite reading to 'rewrite sociology'. (1983. 1005)

Although Giddens' own claim that his work has major significance for the understanding of late modernity and socialist theory of society is contestable, nevertheless, as Bob Mullan notes,

"Giddens' work emphasises more than many the role of human agency ..." (1987. 5).

That Giddens more than any other sociologists emphasised the role of human agency was not just an assertive fact in the mind of those sociologists who favoured this Giddensian 'Re-Writing Project' in early seventies right after Gouldner's prophetic warning. But it was praise for a new re-emerging breed of sociologists who could save western sociology from its continuing crisis in Urry's words. (1977. 911)

Some authors, such as Rex in eighties, went even further to declare that,

"There are many who would argue that Giddens represents the major significant

development in English sociology. This claim, however, is difficult to assess, since it is extremely unlikely that there are many practising sociologists who even begin to understand the issues with which he is concerned" (1983. 1005).

And others such as Mullan concluded that Rex was not surely too cynical about Giddens and his sociological 'Re-writing Project', and in addition argued the substantial significance of Giddens for western sociology. (1987. 4-5)

In other words, although there are many who do not consider Giddens and his philosophization of sociology rewarding, nevertheless they all agree that certainly without doubt " ... Giddens has been the most oft-quoted British sociologist" (Mullan, 1987. 4) since late 1970s. And there is no argument that the very politics of quotation and citation is not a matter of accident or chance in *academicus terra* or academic context.

On the contrary, it demonstrates the relevance of the author and the topics raised by the author. Although it is not certain that whatever raised and discussed are accepted by the community of intellectuals, nevertheless it demonstrates that one has made a point and a very substantive point indeed. Now if his points are taken or not, this is beside the point, which concerns us deeply here in this article that looks at Giddens from a Muslim intellectual's point of departure. Because the issue is not an orthodoxal agreement upon all the issues raised, and as Mann argues,

"Sociology can only be a society's understanding of itself and this, of course, is contested and constantly in flux; in other words no orthodoxy exists" (1983. p.v.).

If I argue that Giddens is one of the contemporary fathers of western sociology this assertion should not be interpreted, as his sociology is the only valid sociology. On the contrary, it should be interpreted as his sociology is one of the substantially significant sociological touchstones in secular social theory which could not be ignored unless at our own peril. And this is one of the meaning of being classics or classical. Being a classic does not mean that everyone does agree with whatever point made by a classical figure.

On the contrary, it means that one cannot get by the points made by the classic and one cannot ignore the points made by the classic. The very impossibility of ignoring and the very imperative of engagement are two sides of the same coin which are inherent in any classical figure or text. That is to say, as what one once said of Kant that, "you can do philosophy with Kant or against Kant, but you cannot do philosophy without him." The same applies to Giddens, i.e. one can do social theory either with Giddens or against Giddens, but certainly not without him. Or as Philip Cassell argues, Giddens

"... is presently at the very forefront of contemporary social theory, and is certainly the pre-eminent figure in the English-speaking world. It is impossible not to be impressed by the extraordinary range of his work, its inventiveness, and its ability to illuminate what is otherwise obscure. His writings are the subject of widespread critical attention ... and his influence on the social sciences is considerable and growing" (1993. 1).

In other words, it would not be unfair to claim that Giddens is one of the avenues to get into the universe of secular social theory today. Imagine that social theory is like a 'city centre' and like all modern city centres there are more than one way to get to the centres. Although the routes to the city centre are many but they are not innumerable. By analogy, the city of sociology has a centre and there are few routes for any sociological pilgrim to get to that centre and without any doubt Giddens is one of those living routes to the Centre of Secular Social Theory. And this point is beyond any fair doubt.

Giddens' Meta-Socio-Theoretical Position

To my knowledge, Giddens has not written about metatheory as a distinct category within or without social theory, sociology or social philosophy. However, this claim should not be understood as a denial of importance of this dimension within his sociological quest. On Giddens' own account, his social theory in terms of being and time is "... strongly influenced by Heidegger ..." (Giddens, 1979. 3); and in terms of knowing social life as a 'form' of life is influenced by Wittgenstein's later philosophy where the latter takes the problem of 'limits of the language' as the fundamental basis of a semantic theory. (Giddens, 1979. 4-5) And above and beyond these obvious meta-sociological threads, one can see many other metaphysical positions that Giddens has successfully appropriated within his social philosophy, which are not expressed explicitly but are implicitly interwoven in the texture of his thought. The question of naturalism is a case in this point. (1979. 8, 237) The 'Critique of Religion' is another case in this regard. (1971. 215, 220-1) His metatheoretical inclinations become more evident when one comes closer to Giddens as a political theorist in relation to family and value-related problems. (1994. 14, 224, 250) His uncritical reliance on 'received wisdom' in terms of *Religionkritik* displays nuances of his metaphysical stance, which could be termed as post-Christian metaphysics called 'secularism'. However, at the outset, I should very briefly announce that by 'secularism' I do not mean 'secularization' which has come, rightly or wrongly, to be associated within social science literature with a historical dynamic - that needs to be empirically assessed and re-assessed. Because, given its existence and dominance, its presence cannot be constant and deemed irreversible. On the other hand, the position Giddens eloquently demonstrates in his sociology is of 'secularism', which is an ideology open to discussion right into its very single premises. It is in this dimension that most of his metaphysical and metatheoretical presuppositions are embedded and implied.

Below, I would bring both implicit and explicit influences in his work into the theoretical fore. And try to explicate them as clearly as possible in terms of what I understand as his metatheoretical inclinations, which could open a tight, but right, avenue for a more open debate with other positions.

I

When one talks about 'Historical Materialism', it is inevitable to recall Marx and to a lesser degree Engels. Although here I am not concerned with what this concept meant in their scheme of philosophy of history, nevertheless it is of importance to emphasize that Giddens' discourse on historical materialism is a tireless engagement, in Giddens' own particular way, with this aspect of Marxism:

A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism seeks to move away from all

forms of teleology save for those directly associated with individual human beings ...
(Giddens, 1981. ix)

This study is ... a ... critical appraisal of some of the main themes of Marx's historical materialism. (Giddens, 1981. 1)

However it should be clear that his critique is not levelled at the philosophical level. Because as Giddens himself is aware, these kind of critiques are abundant and widespread among both Marxists and anti-Marxists circles either in Western Europe or Eastern Europe, and not mentioning among Muslim intellectuals such as Iqbal, Muttahari, Shariati, al-Attas or Hassan Hanafi. Giddens is more concerned with the thematic aspects of Marx's historical materialism and its application on historical phenomena. He vehemently argues that

My intention is not to produce a critique of historical materialism written in hostile mien, declaring Marxism to be redundant or exhausted. There has been an abundance of attempts of that sort ... (Giddens, 1981. 1)

His approach to Marx's historical materialism is a thematic approach in the sense that he takes the major social theoretical concepts within Marx social theory and assesses them individually or collectively in the light of recent philosophical and interdisciplinary thoughts. Issues discussed by Giddens in terms of a contemporary critique of historical materialism range from the concepts of 'Time', 'Property', 'Class', 'Labour', 'State', 'Nation', 'Capitalism', 'Socialism', 'City', 'Power', and etc. In one word, the whole conceptual arsenal of Marxism is at stake in Giddens critical and contemporary assessment. (Giddens, 1981. 1-25)

Giddens' approach to Marx's social theory is based on a firm belief that

"Marx's analysis of the mechanisms of capitalist production ... remains the necessary core of any attempt to come to terms with the massive transformations that have swept through the world since the eighteenth century" (1981. 1).

But this belief is a reflexive one; at least on Giddens own account. Because there is, Giddens argues, much in Marx that is mistaken, ambiguous or inconsistent. (1981. 1) And Giddens' epochal conception of social theory and the conditionality of sociological imagination (due to its epochal parameters) compel him to declare that

Marx's writings exemplify features of nineteenth-century thought which are plainly defective when looked at from the perspective of our century. (1981. 1)

Although he does not 'plainly' explicate what is our century's determining perspective, nevertheless Giddens is completely certain about the defectiveness of Marxism and its social theoretical injunctions. This certainty emerges very strongly when Giddens takes issue with Marx's all-comprehensive dimensions of politics-ethics-philosophy-social theory in relation to critical theory and its inevitable re-structuration:

"In refashioning critical theory, we need Marx's realism: that is to say, political strategies must be shaped by diagnoses of immanent trends of institutional development. On the other hand, in opposition to Marx, we also need utopias: forms

of idealism, influenced by ethical considerations, which suggest how the good society might be pictured. A reworked critical theory, such as I conceive of it at any rate, would mix utopianism and realism in equal measure" (Giddens, 1995. xix).

This realist-idealist approach to Marx and Marxism is based on his radical conception of science and social science where he takes the very concept of 'scientificity' in a new light. For most of their disciplinary history, to say the least, scientific disciplines, such as Physics, Chemistry, Biology and etc. were considered as hard sciences in comparison to Humanities and Liberal Arts, which were branded as 'soft' disciplines. The emergence of social sciences is situated within these para-disciplinary schemata of conceptualizing knowledge. This distinction implied a categorical imperative on behalf of soft knowledge pursuits and social sciences in accelerating their efforts in becoming 'harder' and 'harder', i.e. less interpretative and more explanatory.

Giddens argues that this state of affair has dramatically changed and the post-positivist philosophies of science do not adhere to this hard-soft doctrine anymore. (1987. 2-3) Because the assumption of science being non-interpretative enterprise is a false one and consequently the social sciences don't need to be less interpretative. In other words, the German idealist tradition of *Verstehen* cannot be regarded as the lowest ideal of scientific explanation. On the contrary, science is "... presumed to be an interpretative endeavour, such that problems of meaning, communication and translation are immediately relevant to scientific theories" (1987. 2).

If science is not all about to collect facts and empirically assess their validity within the parameters of logical empiricism or positivism, then Marx's (or even the mainstream nineteenth-century social thought) view that critical social analysis should dispense with ethical values "... should not be accepted". (Giddens, 1995. xviii). The reason for Giddens' rejection in distinguishing between politics and ethics in one hand and social theory in other hand is his belief that sociology does not take the world as given. Not because there is an inherent reluctance on sociology's behalf to take things for granted. Far from it; the reason is simply there is nothing 'social' that one can take it for granted. The social and all its manifestations are 'negotiable' products and critical theory should pose double-edged questions. That is to say, sociology should ask, for example, what types of social change are feasible and desirable (and this is an ethical question), and how should we strive to achieve them (and this is a political quest). And the one who asks these both questions is the sociologist who incorporates the idea of critical social theory in his person. (Giddens, 1986. 1-22, 157)

In other words, a theory of society based on 'Scientific Socialism', which was based on an uncritical remodelling of social sciences in accordance to 'supposed' natural scientific ideal is doomed to failure. And what Giddens offers instead is 'Utopian Realism'. (Cassell, 1993. 330) His utopian realism has two dimensions. One is the theoretical or meta-theoretical aspects which are close (just in terms of its realism, not utopianism) to Indian philosopher Bhaskar's critical realism and the other part are related to his politics of modernity. (Giddens, 1994. 246)

Although both aspects are interconnected Giddens would like us to believe that they could be taken separately. That is to say, the rejection of one should not lead to the refusal of the other.

For Giddens, the main philosophical trends in modernity are caught in the subject-object dualism, just as social theory is engaged with the structure-agent dichotomy. In order to rectify what he sees as a lack in the social sciences in terms of a theory of action, Giddens critically appropriates elements of functionalism, structuralism, the hermeneutic philosophy of Hans Georg Gadamer, on the one hand and critical scientific realism of Roy Bhaskar in the other hand. (Giddens, 1982. 1-17) This collectively reappropriated conceptual frame of social theoretical position is called by Giddens the *theory of structuration*. (Giddens, 1979. 2)

The theory of structuration, in its formal dimension, is based on a methodological proposition, i.e. the lack of a theory of agency in the metasociology. (Giddens, 1976.) But this formal aspect has a normative dimension as well, which seeks to reappropriate the critical realism of Bhaskar in a very selective sense. The critical realism of Bhaskar seeks to build a 'common sense ontology' based on the realist and materialist premise that the objects of science exist independently of the activities of science and condition the limits of scientific theories. This, in Andrew Collier's words, means that realism is substantially an ontology before it is an epistemology. Scientific explanations do not invoke universal laws - rather, science exposes the causal mechanisms beneath the phenomenal forms registered in experience or experimentation. Bhaskar is therefore not committed to a *unified field theory* or to the unity of scientific rationality - only to the concept of inference to the best explanation and to the realist principle that the causal mechanisms disclosed by science *exist*. (See Ch. 1, 1994)

Yet Giddens, while sympathetic (Giddens cast his conceptions of social phenomena in ontological terms and explicitly contravenes positivist injunctions against metaphysical postulates.*), retreats from Bhaskar's programme for a science of society. (Giddens, 1979. 63) Although it might seem irrelevant to mention that Bhaskar is a Marxist and Giddens is not; nevertheless this is an important fact if one takes Giddens' view of the role of social theory and its ethico-political consequences into consideration. (Giddens, 1995. xviii) For Giddens, the distinction between *Geist* and *Natur* means that social theory is predominantly *hermeneutic* and not *scientific*. Although he proposes that social ontologies are pragmatically oriented towards the solution of particular problems, in specific regional contexts, in reality the theory of structuration creates 'ontologically-based theory', to use Cohen's description of Giddens' approach (1987. 9) and political hermeneutics, to use Geoff Boucher's description of Giddens' politics. (2001. See the chapter on Political Hermeneutics) It is this ontological orientation to the self-understanding of actors that informs Giddens' rejection of functionalism. (Geoff Boucher, 2001)

In believing that a sociologist is not a scientific observer standing apart from the society and in proposing that the sociologist is not a participant observer (who interprets the subjective responses of social agents in Winchian terms) either - but rather he is a combination of both objective and subjective elements, Giddens attempts to go beyond contemporary dualistic approaches to social reality. (Geoff Boucher, 2001. See the chapter on Towards Structuration Theory) This belief has,

* In regard to the Giddensian move from epistemologically-oriented social theory to ontologically-committed social philosophy (and their assumed liberating consequences) see: *Structuration Theory and Social Praxis*; by Ira J. Cohen in *Social Theory Today*, edited by Anthony Giddens and Jonathan Turner, 1987. 276.

above epistemological and apart from methodological considerations, a praxiological significance for Giddens in terms of delineating his political position both within European currents and Global politics. In *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics* (1994), Giddens elaborates his position in contrast to Habermasian version of modernism and Foucaultian branch of postmodernism by arguing that a radical politics needs to be " ... reconstituted ... on philosophic conservatism but [should preserve] some of the core values hitherto associated with socialist thought" (Giddens, 1994. 12).

Giddens' normative concern with both politics and ethics in conjunction with his politicized conception of social theory and his own role as a leading defender of non-radical positions pave the way for a non-disciplinary debates on grand issues such as 'Human Existence', 'Existential Contradiction', 'Revival of Ethics', and so on. (Giddens, 1995. xviii) His concern with politics is an ethical engagement, which reciprocally conditions his political theory that is, in turn, an expression of his ethical vision. Let me explain what I mean by the reciprocity of Giddens' political and ethical theories.

In *The Third Way: A Renewal of Social Democracy* (1998), Giddens sets to 'rethink' the very project of democracy in terms of social solidarity and ethical responsibility. (Giddens, 1998. 113-7) In *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics* (1994), Giddens explored his view of social solidarity as follows:

"In a world of high reflexivity, an individual must achieve a certain degree of autonomy of action as a condition of being able to survive and forge a life; but autonomy is not the same as egoism and moreover implies reciprocity and interdependence. The issue of reconstructing social solidarities should therefore not be seen as one of protecting social cohesion around the edges of an egoistic marketplace. It should be understood as one of reconciling autonomy and interdependence in the various spheres of social life, including the economic domain" (Giddens, 1994. 13).

In other place, he expounds his idea of 'existential contradiction' by connecting the idea of 'personhood' to what he calls the 'rediscovery of moral life' by the social agent. (1994. 224). That is to say:

"One cannot 'become someone' without rediscovering the moral life, no matter how oblique or fragmentary that re-counter might be. Or perhaps this should be put the other way around. Without such a contact with an ethics of personal life, a brittle compulsiveness tends to take over ..." (1994. 224).

Although Giddens' social theory is ethically impregnated nevertheless his concern on ethical issues should not be conflated with traditional formal debates on ethicality and morality. In other words, in rethinking democracy in order to foster social solidarity and bring about ethical responsibility, Giddens does not ask what the substantial components of a universal ethics are; or what is the meaning of responsibility and how an ethic of responsibility is conceivable in Late Modern Capitalism.

In order to address the current socio-political and even geo-political issues (EU is such a case and Fundamentalism is another one), he chooses to think within the

parameters of Western Social Democratic institutions. And the concept of a dialogical democracy is intended to perform this task. (Giddens, 1998. 113-7) In addition to and despite of formal ethics, Giddens approach to normative dimension of collective ethics is his catchword of 'cosmopolitan citizenship'. This concept is based on universal values that are emerging today and have global significance, argues Giddens. (1994. 253)

His global cosmopolitanism is based on the belief that the world community is a post-traditional society, which needs to be galvanized and promote 'cosmopolitan solidarity' - which would enable us to curb the fundamentalist threat. (1994. 253) Although it is not clear what would happen if a regional supra-state structure such as the Islamist Umma which principally does not share the normative aims and goals of Giddensian Global Cosmopolitanism emerges, however one can predict the hypothetical scenario when one looks at polity issues such as family and values related to it and to run ahead than our story one can predict that Giddens is not happy about the emergence of such a geopolitical reality as it is not Number 10 or White House.

In realizing social solidarity based on ethical responsibility in relation to cosmopolitan citizenship, Giddens assigns a significant role to the family both as a concept and as an institution, which educates a citizen whose responsibility is based on shared normative principles. The family along nation (and the state) and the European Union constitute the very basics of cosmopolitan citizenship that Giddens has in mind. (Geoff Boucher, 2001. See the chapter on The Politics of the Third Way) However his totalizing approach to social reality and its connection to both regional and global politics in the absence of normative values (in relation to family and how it should and ought to be conceived) would, to say the least, run the risk of ethnocentrism. Let me explain what I mean by providing an example from the field of family and family values.

Giddens, for instance, views the diversity of family forms in post-traditional society as a pioneering act that would increase the centrality of 'life politics'. (1994. 14) For instance, to have a post-traditional and non-heterosexual family form is not a 'life chance', but a 'life style', which should be recognized, if the societal solidarity, i.e. the cement of citizenry sentiments is our concern. (Giddens, 1994. 14-15) The 'Asian Values' supported by Asian intellectuals such as Buddhist (Sulak Sivaraksa, Chairat Kantawong, Pracha Hutawatr) and Muslim intellectuals (Chandra Muzaffar, Sharifah Munirah Alatas, Dato Osman Bakar) are prominent cases in this regard, which don't share the Giddens' value-ideology. (Sivaraksa & Muzaffar, 1999) I will not explore this aspect any further at this juncture but surely would instantiate and substantiate the points in the next section. (See Critique)

Giddens' value-agnosticism or his inattentiveness in relation to transcendental values is related to his belief that social agents " ... produce, sustain and alter whatever degree of 'systemness' exists in society" (1981. 41-8; 1984. 164-5) That is to say, the one who creates values and delineates the normative boundaries of values versus non-values is the social agent who deems heterosexuality a decent norm today and homosexuality a modern life style tomorrow. I should haste to add that this post-traditional value-conception is related to Giddens' *ReligionKritik*, shared by many modern secular intellectuals, which would be addressed later on in this part.

Yet here again it must be underscored that the Giddensian approach to the social agent and the value-creativity of agency is part of substantive elements of his structuration theory. That is to say, the structuration theory is, before anything else, an *ontology of potentials*. Or as Ira J. Cohen puts it:

"[The structuration theory] ... maintains that one potential possessed by all social agents is the ability to produce historical variations in their own forms of conduct" (Cohen, 1987. 288-9).

In other words, the critique of historical materialism, despite Giddens' own insistence that his is not a philosophical approach, when couched with Giddens' ontological quest is aimed at reconstructing liberalism and its philosophy of individual. That is to say, Giddens' approach to historical materialism was meant to " ... move away from all forms of teleology" (Giddens, 1995. ix) except for 'designs' or 'teleologies' that are directly associated with individual human beings.

Although Giddens does not provide any argument against the Marxian belief that the sum of human history has a meaning, nevertheless he holds that " ... there is no overall teleology to history ..." (1995. ix). Giddens' *Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* ranges across three volumes and two decades, yet the guiding idea could not be sought in various themes he attempts to remould. On the contrary, the very meta-theoretical or metaphysical stance of Giddens' post-traditional materialism is based on one absolute presupposition in Collingwoodian sense:

"... history has no teleology or overall dynamic form" (Giddens, 1995. x).

Having this in mind, Giddens goes through all aspects of social theory and themes and puts forward his own 'Utopian Realism'. (1990. 154-8) Although he rejects what he discerns in Marx as 'providentialism' (1995.x), nevertheless he does not want the 'social agents' lose the ability to 'foresee'. One of the meanings of 'Providence' is to have foresight. To foresee is not substantially the same as providentialism but the ability to foresee is embedded in the idea of providentialism.

Based on his earlier *'Religionkritik'*, Giddens makes clear that his ontological sociology and philosophy of agency do not have transcendental basis. Although Giddens does not discuss religion as such nevertheless there is a substantial debate on this issue by him in early seventies based on a reconstructive approach to the Classics.

Giddens does not explicitly reveal that his utopian realism and the values embedded in his politics which would enable us to bring about his utopia into the realm of reality (hence his insistence on realism) have substantial connections to his view on religion. Nevertheless it is doubtless that any discussion about values could not afford to ignore the problematique of 'sacralization versus secularization' of values. And this is another way of saying what the place of religion in the scheme of modernity *is*. Although most of modern discussions on religion within sociology are aimed at the external aspect of religion nonetheless this external concern does reveal a 'sociological consensus' on the value of intellectual content of religion (or religious intellectual discourses).

However the problems of 'values' and how to absolutize them while aware of modern stance on moral relativism is the excellent occasion where the 'content of religion' (and religious thought as an intellectual category, in general, and Muslim intellectual tradition, in particular) re-emerges from the ashes of modern critique of religion.

Although some sociologists of religion like James A. Beckford (2001) would argue that Giddens has " ... necessarily anything interesting or new to say about" religion, all the same it is a mistake to disregard Giddens' position on transcendental issues as uninteresting. Because his view on religion is part of a tradition that assumes that the contentual relevance of religion has long been discussed and relegated to the bookshelf of history. And as for its symbolic meaning, one could follow three classical critiques of religion best exemplified by Marx (religion as a false consciousness); Durkheim (religion as a factual mirroring of the reality of social order and what makes moral society to be held together); and Weber (religiously or magically motivated behaviour is relatively rational behaviour which follows rules of experience, though it is not necessarily action in accordance with a means-ends schema best exemplified in capitalistic entrepreneurial frame of action).

Like most secular sociologists, Giddens agrees that the birth of modernity has coincided with a decline of religion. This process is called secularization. (Giddens, 1971. 205) Although he distinguishes between different levels of secularization however his ontology is a materialist view of being. That is to say, he thinks that the rise of rationalism into all spheres of social life is a progressive historical movement, which causes a tremendous displacement of religious thought and practice. (Giddens, 1971. 206)

Here, I would not explicate what Marx or other sociologists thought about religion but try, instead, to present very briefly what Giddens thinks of religion. Because I think his stance in relation to religion (and his disengagement with religious thought or traditions) demonstrate a deeper side of his metaphysical and existential views on grand issues such as the normative content of 'emancipation', 'utopia', 'family values' and 'values' in general.

In different ways the classical social thinkers of the late 19th and early 20th century (of Christian calendar) all thought that religion would either disappear or become progressively attenuated with the expansion of modern institutions, resulting in a "secularization thesis" aptly captured in the title of Freud's famous *The Future of an Illusion* (see Durkheim, 1912/1965; Freud, 1957; Marx and Engels, 1848/1858; Tylor, 1871; Weber, 1904/1958: 182; and Giddens, 1990: 207)

Giddens' writing from within this secular brand of sociological tradition adopts the classical view on the declining role of religion (1971. 205). And more importantly this view on the declining role of religion allows him to brand any political force that unites with a traditional religion as dangerously radical which needs to be pushed off "the middle ground" (Lars Kaspersen, 2000. 183). Giddens' exegesis of Marx, Weber and Durkheim gives him the apt opportunity to express his overall views on issues such as universalism and moral relevance by saying:

"... the difference between the two thinkers [Durkheim and Marx] upon this issue [the question of the 'illusory' character of religious belief as an appropriate bridge

between the theory of primitive religion, and the significance of religion in modern societies], as in the case of Weber and Marx, stem from a discrepancy in their respective ethical standpoints. Durkheim rejects philosophical neo-Kantianism in favour of his own particular conception of ethical relativism, based upon the notion of social 'pathology'. According to this view, the 'valid' morality for one type of society is not appropriated to a society of a different type; there are no moral ideals which can claim universal validity" (Giddens, 1971. 220).

Giddens endorses the relativity of moral ideals and argues that religious ethos is not functionally compatible with modern life. He holds that Durkheim is right in rejecting the Freudian thesis on religion as illusion but this view should not be conflated with any substantial and intellectual significance of religion and more importantly with world religions' own claim of universalism. In explicating Durkheim's thesis on religion, Giddens attempts to connect this classical view (religion as based on the only reality, i.e. the factual order of society) to his own 'consequences of modernity-thesis' by saying:

"For Durkheim, by contrast [to Marx's thesis of alienation which argued that the hold of religion is nonetheless based upon an 'illusion', since it disguises human capacities as those of super-human powers], religion cannot be illusory in this sense, except insofar as a given set of religious beliefs is no longer functionally compatible with the existence of a given type of society. This [hold Giddens emphatically] indeed is the case with traditional religion in modern society" (Giddens, 1971. 221).

In other words, Giddens argues that everything changes and the societal transformations bring new needs and modes except what he calls 'traditional religion'. Although he admits that the normative modernity has forced religious ethos to adapt to modern conditions nevertheless religion as a category is a dogmatic and non-changeable entity. That is to say, religion as a symbolic expression of the 'Holy' should accept the role given to it by the secularizing process. And Giddens has a normative view on the sacred, which comes to the fore very lucidly when he tries to put Marx's utopian view against Durkheim's sober realism:

*"The transcendence of religion [in Marx's view] is possible because the resolution of the dichotomy and opposition between the individual and society is possible. From Durkheim's position [which is Giddens' own view as well], this is sheerly utopian, as regards the organisation of contemporary societies. There is a sense in which Durkheim is in accord with Marx that a form of society can exist in which there is no dichotomy between the individual and society - in the case of mechanical solidarity. Mechanical solidarity 'binds the individual directly to society without any intermediary'. But this societal form has ceded place to organic solidarity, and cannot be recovered; and even if it were possible, the type of society envisaged by Marx would only be conceivable given a reimposition of a pervasive **conscience collective**, which would necessarily entail a vast re-extension of the realm of sacred" (Giddens, 1971. 222-223).*

Although Giddens argues that this is a contrast between Marx and Durkheim nevertheless it would be a mistake not to discern Giddens' own position in this lucid interpretation of classical views on religion. Because Giddens holds that organic solidarity (one of the consequences of modernity) has already substantially and

ontologically taken over the mechanical societal formation. And it is not possible to recover the pre-modern mode of being.

In analyzing the modern capitalist ethos and the role of secularization, Giddens argues (and this argument is related to his view why religion and its role is not irrecoverable) that both Marx and Weber

"... treat mature capitalism as a world in which religion is replaced by a social organization in which technological rationality reigns supreme. Marx frequently underlines the secularising effects of the progression of capitalism, which 'has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egoistic calculation'. It is because of this that ... in bourgeois society, ... 'all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life and his relations with his kind' " (Giddens. 1971. 215).

Between these lines, Giddens argues that the consequences of modernity change three fundamental issues: ontology, epistemology, and existential mode of being. Given the fact that he does not offer any reasons for the universality of these changes and additionally due to his critique of historical materialism (which is based on the view that history does not have any telos and hence accidental), and then one may pose the following question:

Why should men in general (and people in non-western contexts in particular) accept these accidental states of Western European affairs in terms of religion and religious ethos?

I might be running ahead than my story but I need to pinpoint to this issue before entering next step. And that is Giddens' approach to the problem of modern and contemporary in relation to 'religion'. Without replying to this question he resorts to Durkheim's sober realism that religion cannot have the all-comprehensive role it had once in mechanic societies as though this mode of description is an explanation.

Before beginning my critique on Giddens, one note is in order. It should be clear from my exposition that Giddens metaphysical or meta-theoretical views are not all expressed in his discussions on or about social theory. On the contrary, I think one should sometimes start from his politics or views of family-values and wherefrom build up an opinion about the foundations of his sociological reasoning. That is why I started with his critique of historical materialism but did not confine my exposition to that realm alone. It is my firm view that one's stance in regard to transcendental issues determines one's politics and social theory as it does with Giddens.

II

Whatever form the 'critique' against Giddens would take, one task is for certain and that is the very concept of 'Critique' and its substantial content. In other words, what are the substantive bases of Giddensian notion of 'Critique'? What are the elementary nurturing substances that hold the very structure of Giddensian 'critique'?

Giddens argue that,

"... a reconstituted critical theory must grapple with what critique means, and how it might be justified, in a world precisely where 'history' has no teleology or overall form" (Giddens, 1995. x).

Before going any further one should be clear about the implicit assumptions of Giddens where he conflates 'teleology' and 'overall dynamic form'. He takes these two concepts as though they are the same and substantially similar notions.

To say 'history' has no goal is not similar to argue that the history of mankind does not have any overall dynamic form. Because, regardless of what one might mean by 'telos' and 'dynamism', the very point is what one does mean by the term 'history'? In what tradition is Giddens standing and declaring that history has no telos? And how could Giddens equate the substantial meaning of 'telos' with 'dynamism'?

Besides if both 'telos' and 'dynamism' are the same for Giddens then how could he save the teleological dimension at the individual level and opt for an organic relation between society and individual?

Although Giddens presents his critique as a contemporary critique of historical materialism within Marxism, however the arrows of his critique are pointed to a wider debate. In my view, the real question is not if the abstract concept of history has any meaning or an overall dynamism. The more significant question is; does the sum of human endeavours and efforts as a being on this planet have a meaning or not? If not, then how could one determine its meaninglessness and wherefrom extract a meaningful individual ideology in the midst of meaningless collective humanity?

I think what Giddens proposes is the constructed and mechanically preserved notions of 'nation and state'. Meanings are particular and meaningfulness is possible in the domain of society. And a functional society is possible where there is a state with clear boundaries, which would make the doings of the state accountable for its citizen. This is, to say the least, the *de facto* recent history of Western Europe. And it could not shed any light on the universal notions of 'meaning', 'history', and 'dynamism and its overall forms'.

However I have not said anything so far about the very concept of 'critique' which envelopes the whole Giddensian idea of social theory as a reconstituted category " ... in a world precisely where history has not teleology ..." (Giddens, 1995. x). His view of critique provides an apt point of departure for us in terms of meta-theoretical assessments.

There have been many critiques of Giddens' structuration theory and its empirical applicability or inapplicability. (McLennan, 1984. 23-9; Cohen, 1986. 123-34, 1989; Cassell, 1993; Craib, 1992.) I would not repeat them here as it would be a detour from our main concerns, which are critical assessments of Giddens' project from a Muslim point of departure. On the contrary, what I would like to do is to converse with Giddens in another level, which I have called the meta-theoretical one. Let me illustrate my points in the following.

Giddens, himself, holds that,

*"... the theory of structuration [is aiming to understand] ... social systems as situated in time-space [and this situated system] ... can be effected by regarding structure as non-temporal and non-spatial, as a **virtual order of differences** produced and reproduced in social interaction as its medium and outcome"* (Giddens, 1979. 3).

In other words, this is the substantial content of structuration theory. My meta-theoretical argument is not aimed at this level. I am not going to discuss how applicable or inapplicable is to view the social universe and societal texture in Giddensian structuration terms. On the contrary, what I am interested is what, to my knowledge, few have paid any attention. And that is Giddens as an intellectual who thinks of existential issues.

In *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, structure, and contradiction in social analysis* (1979), Giddens states that he invents this intellectual tool (called structuration theory) in order to grasp something which goes on above and beyond our theories. *Unser Leben geht hin mit Verwandlung*, i.e. Our life passes in transformation is what Giddens seek to grasp by his structuration theory. (1979. 3-7) And then he says:

None of us would have anything to live for, if we didn't have something worth dying for. (BBC Reith Lectures 1999. Lecture 3- Tradition-Delhi)

Put these two sentences together, then you will undoubtedly get a Giddens who is an existential thinker that does sociology; not a conventional existentialist though. Every thought has a parameter. Or to put it differently; each thinker works within specific parameters. The streaks of one's parameters are like fences that guard one's garden of thought. Giddens' sociological thought is substantively concerned with 'transformational nature of our life'. Although he talks about 'surveillance', 'state', 'nation', 'violence', 'democracy', 'property', 'labour', 'cosmopolitanism', and so many other empirical notions within social theory, nevertheless he comes to these issues and this theoretical realm from one specific angle. By concentrating and confining our sociological quest to this aspect of Giddens would deprive us from a very significant dimension of his thought, which, if not the most important, is as important as the theoretical side of Giddens. And that is Giddens as a man who thinks of social issues both in normative and descriptive sense, even he does not, at times, state his normative concerns very clearly or explicitly like Muslim intellectuals such as Nasr, al-Attas, F. Schuon (Sheikh Isa), Martin Lings (Sheikh Seraj al-Deen), Imam Musa Sadr, Ali Shariati, Ayatullah Taleghani, Ayatullah Beheshti, Imam Khomeini, Seyyed Baghir Sadr, Ayatullah Muttahari and so on and so forth.

Giddens, before entering the realm of empirical issues, **must** have had an 'impetus'. He must have had an urge that made him to 'commit' to certain moral obligations over others. And the nature of these moral obligations is not a passive one. These moral obligations inform and shape the very direction of his intellectual thought. The universe of this impetus is what characterizes Giddens' entire sociological/intellectual/existential quest. This is what I called meta-theory or for the lack of better word I would call metaphysics of social theory.

It is beyond any doubt that Giddens is not a Marxist. That is not any crime in itself but what makes his position towards Marxism substantially significant is the very idea of 'critique'. How is a critique possible? How could one launch a critique? That one can 'launch' something presupposes that one has already occupied a position in order to use his 'lance' against an enemy. This is the etymological meaning of the term, which is preserved in our modern use of the phrase: launching a critique. To launch a critique, one needs to have an intellectual position. To detect a thinker's intellectual position the best way is to look at 'who' or what 'position' he is 'against'. The contrast between Giddens and Marxism is educationally significant and intellectually enlightening. For it gives us the opportunity to present a critique which is not either Marxian or Giddensian, but not for that matter irrelevant either.

His view in relation to social life as something that should be connected to ideals and values that are worth 'dying' for opens an apt opportunity for a critique of his own critique. His views on what makes a life worth living and dying for are an abbreviated form of continental existentialism. Although it is of importance to note that due to the supremacy of analytic philosophy in Anglo-Saxon world there was no significance space for existentialism as a philosophical option. Nevertheless the collapse or disintegration of analytic tradition in its hegemonic form explains the belated emergence of existential concerns within sociology in general and Giddens' in particular.

However the question is what are the parameters of human existence depicted by Giddens? How much of this picture is borne out of Giddens as a British, how far as Giddens as a secular humanist, and how deep as Giddens as a sociologist who practices an intersubjective enterprise?

Family, the idea of Cosmopolitanism, Values, Self, Agency, and Religion are major areas that the substantial infrastructure of 'Critique' in Giddens' sociology expresses itself in full force. Although one could reassess the credentials of Giddensian critique of Marxian critique, however I would not take that route. Because, apart from that there have been many debates in that direction, the bases of Giddensian and Marxian *Weltbild* are not substantially different from each others once viewed upon from a Muslim point of departure. In other words, they both do share the same metaphysical horizon, regardless of what the appearances might suggest otherwise. Here, I would like to confine myself to two fundamental concepts of 'family' and 'religion'. I hope that this critical engagement would extract out Giddens' meta-theory and metaphysical foundations of his social philosophy.

Giddens and Basic Collective Unit of Humanity: Family

Giddens does not have any normative conception about what the family should be, but ironically enough he has a normative concept about how the family should be regulated. In discussing the so-called 'diversity' of family forms in Europe, Giddens uses the concept of 'pioneering'. (1994. 14) He says:

"Strengthening family commitments and obligations, so long as these are based on active trust, does not 'seem' incompatible with the diversity of family forms now being

'pioneered' in all the industrialized societies" (Giddens, 1994. 14).

If one doesn't have any normative conception about what family is then how could one be sure that the application of 'commitments', and 'obligations' from another institution would function and fit on a different institution?

The institution of family is consisted of two human beings; one called 'Mother' and the other is 'Father'. This is, at least prior to the pioneering act of industrialized nations, what one called family. If now the relationship between two men or two women is supposed to be regulated and legalized, regardless of all its religious as well as moral dilemmas (not mentioning biological and medical consequences), then one cannot use the same concept as 'family' for these new evolutionary forms of relationship. Because the concept of family is not a descriptive term founded by social scientists who can reformulate it as they may please today. The concept is part of religious traditions and is in its totality a normative concept; a concept which is meant to convey a world-philosophy and a particular set of religio-moral obligations.

One can discern the confusion created by Giddens when one comes to his view about how the modern family should be regulated:

"Contractual commitment to a child could thus be separated from marriage ... enforcing parenthood contracts ... Children should have responsibilities to their parents ... could be legally binding ..." (1994. 95-97).

And,

"There is only one story to tell about the family today, and that is of democracy. The family is becoming democratized, in ways which track processes of public democracy ..." (1994. 93).

Giddens focuses on the market and the growth of contractual relations as the substantially significant trend, and he describes this process as one of 'democratization'. But is this tenable? Is the diversity of relationship a form of 'pioneering' in terms of family and educational-emotional values? Without a substantial discussion of the psychology of 'man' and 'woman', and the differences between them Giddens sets out to tell the only 'pioneering' story of family. And ironically enough, Giddens explains the institution of family in non-capitalistic contexts as " ... above all an economic and kinship unit" (1994. 91), as though those societies stopped moving and transforming themselves historically into new forms which are not necessarily Giddensian.

In Giddens' social theory, the normative content of the concept of family is disregarded. Moreover, he does not conceptualize the substantial significance of transcendental values that hold together the familial life to the communal one. Giddens is aware of the significance of 'sacred' in his existential quest when he states that

" ... all of us need moral commitments that stand above the petty concerns and squabbles of everyday life. ... None of us would have anything to live for, if we didn't have something worth dying for" (BBC Reith Lectures 1999. Lecture 3- Tradition-

Delhi.).

But, in his existential reflections, there is no substantive space assigned to the problem of sacred. In other words, he, first of all, does not pose the fundamental question what is 'sacred'? Or how is 'sacred' possible in a materialistic theory of being? Secondly, how does one decide the realm of sacred from non-sacred? What are the methodologies for recognizing the realm of sacredness? It is of importance to mention that, one of the reasons that Giddens' meta-theoretical dimension is poorly equipped in terms of fundamental questions is that he has not raised these questions in his sociology in the first place. Giddens admits that this fundamental and existentially inevitable (and metaphysically imperative) question was asked by 'fundamentalists' (BBC Reith Lectures 1999. Lectures 3- Tradition-Delhi.), who resist and oppose secular humanism and normative globalism but he does not admit that materialism cannot but suffocate human spirit which is the sole foundation of sacrality and all that is Holy and world-shaking.

Every critique has a particular point of departure. Giddens' notion of 'Critique' deprives him of asking questions that are existentially imperative for our life and death; the questions one cannot live without. That's why in his substantial works; there are no serious or in-depth discussions about the 'sacred' and the 'holy as fundamentally and existentially significant themes. If the idea of 'sacred' is an inevitable imperative for the survival of the fabric of society, then it must be clear what are the sources of the 'Holy'? The 'Sacred' does not receive its sacredness from the 'societal consensus'. If it does, then it is not 'sacred'. It is some kind of 'nationalism' or 'chauvinism' based on 'blood', 'language', 'geographical location', 'normative globalism as pan-nationalism', 'shared history' or alike which cannot reach humanity at large.

The lack of any substantial engagement with the idea of 'sacred' from within the religious intellectual traditions drives Giddens towards prescribing a normative globalism of nationalist kind (and in his case which is deeply interwoven with English foreign policy which has been profoundly colonial in character and imperialistic in direction, namely devoid of any substance), but based on a wider view of nation, i.e. European Nation rather than British, Scottish, German or alike. In one of his lecture, Giddens holds that

"We should be prepared to mount an active defence of [our Cosmopolitan values] wherever they are poorly developed, or threatened" (Giddens, 1999).

This is the fundamentalism of the stronger, or what used to be called the discourse of 'imperialism' or 'neo-colonialism', which guards the benefits of the 'colonial powers'. Moreover, if the fundamentalism asks the right question about the relation between 'sacred' and 'family', and Giddens does not ask this fundamental question (but admits the inevitability of this question) then why should one accept his trendy views on family and its diversified forms over the fundamentalist ones?

Giddens does not provide us with any conception about transcendental values when it comes to the fundamental concepts. But this lack does not stop him in using transcendental position in 'regulating' social and political problems. The problem of family is not an isolated issue in his sociology but it is related to his view on 'sacred'.

Within secular sociology, the idea of 'Holy' or 'Sacred' does not have any substantial consequence or relevance. The only 'function' it generates is cementing of social bonds, whatever 'forms' those bonds would take.

The concept of family is a value-laden concept like religion, knowledge, wisdom, sacred, and holy. Without deciding the source of 'values' and what are the substantial elements of values versus non-values, Giddens jump into labelling some recent social configurations within Western societies as 'pioneering act'. It is not clear what makes a social movement a 'progressive' or 'regressive' one. One might argue that what has this concept to do with the meta-theoretical aspect of sociology?

The question is a very apt one indeed. When Giddens argues that the only story about family is the story of democratization, he is not getting into the bottom of one of the most problematic issues of modern time. And that is what **'Man'** is? What is the normative, or if you like the moral, basis for relation between an individual to another individual and the individual to the community? Is the relation between humans one of a contract or covenant? (Jonathan Sacks, 2000. 61-4)

Without a substantive discussion on the essential elements of moral sense (James Q. Wilson, 1993. 251), it would be futile to brand some forms of diversity as 'pioneering' and 'progressive'. Additionally, it would be very naïve to design the parameters of the story of 'family' in terms of 'democracy' (whatever that word means) as Giddens proposes. (1994. 93)

The story of family is more of 'covenant' than 'contract'. The demise or decline of 'covenant' in modern societies is not a sign of 'pioneering' or 'progress'. Instead of opening a debate about 'what should be done?' Giddens argues for 'how should we regulate?' And then here again, one is left without any substantive guidelines in relation to his propositions. If these propositions (e.g. family form) are not transcendental and therefore binding, then how could one deem their emergence 'pioneering'? Because if this is a pioneering form which emerged in all 'industrialized societies' then the next step (as all modern forms and productions which emerge in West and should be applied in the Rest) is its universalization. And the second step would be to deem all the forces which resist this 'distorted notion of universality' as 'Fundamentalism' and dangerous for Giddens' branch of metaphysics.

Giddens argues that the most basic question asked by fundamentalism is: can we live in a world where nothing is sacred? And, his own answer is the following: I don't think we can. (BBC Reith Lectures 1999. Lecture 3) Although he does not give any accounts of what are the answers of fundamentalists (because he regards them as problematic and the enemy of cosmopolitan dialogue which he counts himself as one of the Cosmopolitans). Nevertheless one is left with questions such as what the basis of sacredness, either immanent or transcendental, within his sociological thought is. Isn't an ontological secular sacredness another post-traditional name for 'secular humanism'?

In other words, without any normative or metaphysical debates on the universal sources of 'utopia', 'values', 'sacredness', 'family', how would one brand a form of relationship which has just emerged recently as 'pioneering' (taking into consideration the demographical problems that haunt secular nations where the numbers of white

race is falling down and other complexities which ensue such falls and downs)? And how could one without any substantial engagement with the idea and ideal of 'sacred' and 'religious thought' which underpins the very concept of family, decide the compatibility between family and diversified forms as a universal category? (1994. 14)

Giddens and Primordial Unit of Meaning: Religion

Giddens' view on religion and tradition is related to his *Weltbild* and demonstrates the metaphysical underpinnings of his social theoretical reflections. The basic struggle of sociologists has been to arrive at a classification of 'substantive' definitions of religion. Broadly speaking, there are two approaches: those which refer to the body of beliefs in reference to 'supernatural' or 'non-empirical' reality; and functional definitions which refer to the function of providing an individual with a sense of belonging and an ultimate meaning for existence. (Bryan Wilson, 1982. 1-26) It should be noted that these definitions are mainly formulated in substantive reference to logical empiricism and analytical philosophy. And the main problem with the first definition is that it takes the ill-defined category of 'supernaturalism' in the same fold as 'non-empirical'. The very category of 'non-empirical' due to the recent development within philosophy of science (post-positivist philosophies) has gone through substantial metamorphoses.♦ And the functional ones are rejected as being "... so all-inclusive that they allow apples and oranges to be cast in the same unproductive bag with golf, Opus Dei and Islam" (McGuire, 1987. 5-11).

Apart from these two broad positions, there are some other intellectuals who prefer to maintain a safe distance from both positions and affirm:

*"The error made by proponents of both substantive and functionalist definitions is to assume that **religion** is a phenomenon which exists in reality and that any belief or practice could be permanently labelled as being either religious or not religious if only we could agree upon an acceptable definition"* (Greil, 1993. 163).

And of course, the substantially agreeable definition is still unavailable or unattainable due to the methodological misconception. The problem with the third position, which is prominent in the works of Luckman (1987), Berger (1973), Lewis Carter (1996), and the substantial and functional ones are the lack of engagement with 'religious intellectual traditions' from within.

This lack is 'justified' by secular social theorists in terms of 'position' and 'methodological insight'. However the use of scientific language should not deceive us that here we are faced with a purely metaphysical or meta-theoretical problem. And that is whose position renders the true nature of reality comprehensible. Although it should be noted that the problem of 'transcendence' is connected to what one does mean by 'comprehension'. Because it could mean the 'ultimate reality' is beyond all analytical comprehension but not for that matter 'unintelligible'. Secular social theorists, due to their analytical philosophical inclinations, take the category of

♦ In addition, it should be mentioned that the substantive definitions have been criticized for disguising the specific historic reality of Judeo-Christianity and church organization as a universal category.

'comprehension' equal to 'analysable'. And this is one of the main reasons why they don't take issue with 'religion' and world religions intellectual traditions from 'within'. And the flaw in the third position (which sets apart itself from the first and second one) should be seen in this light i.e. its lack of intellectual engagement with religious intellectual traditions. Each world religious traditions such as Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam and etc. have its own specific notion of 'intellect' and 'intelligible'.

However, after these primary remarks, I would like to look at Giddens' view on religion and tradition. It is my firm belief that his views on moral values, religious sensibility and modernity are not all derived from one empirical category. On the contrary, there are reasons to believe that what scaffolds the structures of his social reflections are not empirically renderable and analytically demonstrable categories, but are based on his 'Ethos'.

Now, the question is, does Giddens have any substantial definition about 'religion' and 'tradition'? What are the bases of his view on 'religion'? How does this view influence his ideas about 'values' and 'ideals'? Could, in other words, one find any correlation between Giddensian view on religion and metatheory?

The short answer is a categorical yes. But before elaborating that point some few primary remarks are needed. The very category of 'religion' by secular social theorists is thought in terms of 'accommodation' to modernity. That is to say, any claims based on 'traditional religions' are thought to be either some kind of rear-guard action on the part of anti-modernist (whatever that means), or they are thought to be the products of some basic accommodation to the realities of modernity, which has secured a permanent place for religion in the contemporary world, but in a much reduced capacity and with declining significance. In other words, few of modern discourses on religion such as Berger (1967, 1983), Hadden (1987), Wilson (1982), Giddens (1971, 1991) and et. al. have truly abandoned the 'positive' correlation of modernity and secularization. They, on the contrary, have merely found ways to modify the secularizationist thesis to allow for some measure of religious survival. However, this 'minimalist approach' in methodology has been described in relation to the empirical appearance of 'religion' as a category in late capitalism or rather as consequences of modernity. That is to say, the sociologists who conceptually minimized the role of 'religion' as an intellectual category did not relate this approach to their own 'Ethos-dimension' position, but explained this meta-sociological approach as an empirical issue. They did not reveal that their own 'Ethos' position is based on 'secular humanism', which would be unintelligible without a substantial reference to the history of Catholicism and post-reformation notion of religion.

In other words, any concern with religion, either as a *Lebensphilosophie* or intellectual category, is explained by reference to the creation of a secularized society, which perpetually accommodates tradition and religion in modern society. (Wilson, 1988. 965) It is this perspective that still dominates most of sociology, especially sociological reflections on the place of religion in a post-traditional society and globalized world (e.g., Robertson and Chirico 1985; Giddens 1991; Bauman 1992; Robertson 1992; Lyon 1996), despite the claims often made to the contrary in these analyses about detecting some important new role for religion in the contemporary world. (See the assessments of these works offered, for example, in Beckford 1996.)

Giddens' assessment of religion in the contemporary context still seems to be restricted to the imaginal horizons set some time ago by such prominent sociologists of religion as Peter Berger and Bryan Wilson. And that's Beckford's point when he criticizes Giddens, Bauman and Manuel Castells (1997) by pointing to the relation between social theory and religion:

"Many of those social scientists and social theorists who had seen no reason to take religion seriously in the middle decades of the 20th century [in Western Europe] were lulled into a false sense of security. Events in the final decades of the century all around the world forced a re-think. This not to say, of course, that writers who suddenly woke up to the unexpected importance of religion such as Giddens, Bauman and Castells have necessarily had anything interesting or new to say about it. The fact that secularization was taken-for-granted for so long helped to make the re-discovery of religion's significance all the more surprising or shocking" (Beckford. 2001).

In explicating Durkheim's views on religion, Giddens informs us that

" ... religion cannot be illusory [in Marxian sense], except insofar as a given set of religious beliefs is no longer functionally compatible with the existence of a given type of society" (Giddens, 1971. 221)

And in affirming this Durkheimian metaphysics, Giddens holds that this

" ... indeed is the case with traditional religion in modern society" (Giddens, 1971. 221).

There are two problems with this view. One is related to the concept of 'society' and the other one is the concept of 'belief'. What are the boundaries of Giddensian society? Are the boundaries of Giddensian society as wide as modern Britain (as depicted in international map located in Europe), or Imperial Britain? Secondly, what are the criteria of assessing 'compatibility' and 'belief'? Are the categories derived from religions the only domain of 'belief' or does belief include other domains of human cognitive activities? Besides, Giddens does not provide us with any analytical means to assess and distinguish if he is taking the category of belief in normative or descriptive sense and if 'the existence of modern society' is conceptualized in normative terms? And if the latter is a normative concept, then where do the norms come from? And if the norms come from technological innovations and scientific explorations, then how and in what sense are they different from 'belief'?

Because I don't think the concept of 'modern society' as an explanatory concept can stand on its own alone. It is evident that within this so-called modern societal universe there are contrasting and contradictory elements which cannot be taken as empirically verifiable or falsifiable criteria in assessing other historical or contemporary processes. In other words, the concept of 'modern society' is not an explanans but an explanandum. That is to say, the ideal-type of modern society is not the same as the actual modern societies where the majority of people do believe in ghosts or other supernatural entities. (Steven D. Schafersman, 1997)

On the other hand, it seems what Giddens refers as functionally incompatible with the

existence of a modern society in relation to traditional religion are confusion between two ideal types that never existed in reality. (1971. 221) Additionally I think what he really means by this 'existential incompatibility' is nothing but a re-statement of what Larry Shiner (1965. 279-95) defined as *the decline of religion*. By this, as Michael Hill holds (1973. 229), is meant that previously accepted symbols, doctrines and institutions lose their prestige and influence; and the end point of such a process would be a religionless society. One of the most classical statements, which informs Giddens' thesis on 'existential incompatibility between traditional religions and modern society', is that of Bryan Wilson (1966, 1969). Wilson defines secularization as a 'process whereby religious thinking, practice and institutions lose social significance'. (See Wilson in Hill, 1973. 230)

The substantial point in Wilson and subsequently Giddens is the concept of 'religious thinking'. According to this tradition, the heralding of modern society influences the area of 'religious thinking' most conspicuously of all. That is to say, Giddens thinks that men act less in terms of religious motivations and view the world in increasingly 'empirical' terms. Although he himself does not use these very terms nevertheless this is what he means. And again, Giddens being situated in this tradition does not say if modern society is where religious thinking does not play any role (a statement of fact)? Or modern society should be where religious thinking does not have any say? It seems he has the regulative conception in mind. A look at his normative globalism reveals this point. This point will be clearer if one looks at his treatment of 'fundamentalist movements'. Giddens argues:

"Fundamentalism is beleaguered tradition. It is tradition defended in the traditional way ... in a globalising world that asks for reasons" (Giddens, 1999. BBC Reith Lecture 3).

Moreover, what is hidden in Giddens' discourse is the arbitrary switching between 'normativity' and 'descriptivity' in using fundamental concepts such as 'tradition', 'religion', and 'modern'. In above-quoted statement Giddens rejects the fundamentalist discourses (and I take this term equal to Islamic discourses due to his own reference to Islam and Iran) due to their 'struggling against criticism'. And the point is not if Giddens is right about that fundamentalists are against critique or not. The substantial point is his formulation of the concept of 'tradition'.

In Giddens' view, the substantial feature of tradition is 'ritual' and 'repetition'. (1999. BBC Lecture 3). This is again another assumption, which does not accord to the reality of what tradition is. At least, in Muslim Tradition (with all its variety) this is not what is meant by the 'Sunna'. One small aspect of Islamic tradition is assigned to what Giddens calls 'rituals' which might look as 'repetitive' when approached from 'without'. It is undeniable that man has an 'inner life' and the state of that inner life is not constant or at the same level all the time. In other words, when someone goes to 'prayer' in its so-called repetitive-ritual form, one is not in the same state of mind in relation to 'Ultimate Reality' (or for Muslims Allah).

But this point apart, the 'tradition' is not confined to this ritual aspect. And a man who approaches the 'religious tradition' does not approach it in terms of 'ritual' and 'repetition' alone. A Muslim scholar approaches the tradition in terms of 'inspiration', and 'imaginal conversation' (Steven M. Wasserstrom, 1999), whereas a painter, a poet

or an artist may approach the tradition from a totally different angle.

Now, the question is why does Giddens caricature 'tradition'? What are his assumptions? There are two points related to his view. One is related to the semantic of ontology of tradition; and the other one is related to the question of 'authenticity and modernity'. As Talal Asad says, the secular notions of tradition are all operating within specific parameters where 1) one takes the story of modernity as the only authentic story where traditions all either evaporated or were accommodated to the modern secular parameters; 2) "real tradition" is unchanging, repetitive, and non-rational. (Asad, 1996) And this is what Giddens means by " ... traditional religion in modern society" (1971. 221) where a given set of religious belief should give away to modern society, even if that modernity means 'colonialism', 'westernism'?

Now it is time to look at Giddens' substantial view on 'religion' and see in what aspect does this view condition his metaphysical engagement with 'religious thinking' and assess, very briefly, the outcome of this conditionality on his metatheoretical imagination within social theory.

In his BBC Reith Lecture series, Giddens present his views on 'Religion' and the metaphysical dimension of his social reflections on issues such as 'Faith', and 'Individual Reflection and the Transcendental Realm' and what is the substantial nature of 'Religion and Faith'. There, Giddens argues that

"Religion is normally associated with the idea of faith, a sort of emotional leap into belief" (1999. Lecture 3).

Although he has already in his substantial work on 'Religion, Ideology, and Society' (1971. 205-223) in relation to the classical social theory set his own views on the 'substantial status' of religion in modern (society and) social theory, nevertheless his views here are worth to be elaborated. Because I think his views on religion is one of the best entries into the universe of his meta-theory.

The historical context of Giddens' *Normal Associational Thesis* on religion needs to be explored in brief. What Giddens calls the substantial element of religion as 'faith' and what he normatively equates with the universal 'emotional leap into belief' are not as 'universal' as he depicts. In this short but normatively depicted account of what 'religion' as a universal category is, Giddens has accomplished and restated few core theses of 'modernity' versus 'religion'. He has tacitly argued a place for 'religion' as an emotional component of human existence. Secondly, he has presented religion as a pre-modern residue, which needs to be accommodated within the modern context a la tradition in general. Thirdly, the Humean Critique of religion is still the guideline of modern discussions about religion. Fourthly, the history of man's relation to transcendental values should be 'read' in terms of secular humanism. Last but not least, the 'context of historical experience' of post-Catholic Western Europe is the infallible norm of metaphysics.

It is not hard to depict that Giddens' views on religion is conditioned by the context of Christianity and should indeed be read within the context of western religious tradition. Although this tradition is not a monolithic whole, nevertheless it could be distinguished from, say, Tibetan Buddhism, Judaism, or Islam.

What Giddens sees as 'Religion' is indeed a specific notion of 'religiosity' which could be understood when seen in relation to the particular historical background. It cannot be taken, as Giddens suggests, as a universal depiction of religion and religious substantive. When he says, religion is normally associated with the idea of faith; one needs to ask about the norms that inform his normative conception of 'religiosity'. For his conception of faith is closely related to Sir Thomas Browne's fideism (Keynes, 1964. 18), where the latter attempts to establish the authority of faith over reason by an appeal to The Classical Christianity. (Cochrane, 1957. 222-24) In this view, which is shared by Giddens as well, the ideas of religion and faith are devoid of any *intellectus*. As a matter of fact, faith is what it is due to its absurdity. Or to put it differently: *Credo quia absurdum est (to be believed because it is absurd)*. I don't think Giddens' scholarly quest has taken him as far as Tertullian but it is certain that he views 'religious phenomenon' in terms of this tradition who has been seen as the forerunner of later religious thinkers who disparaged 'reason' such as Bayle, Kierkegaard and Barth. (Osborn, 1997)

In other words, when Giddens says that "... [R]eligion is ... a sort of emotional leap into belief ...", he is actually discussing or viewing 'religion' in terms of Kirkegaardianism, which definitely differs from, say, Buddhist, or Islamic view on 'intellectus' and 'fides'. At least, in Islamic Tradition, one's 'Din' (one's presence in life) is not complete when the 'aql' (reason) is not employed in matters of life, which obviously include 'Akhira' or transcendental issues as well.

What I want to say is that Giddens' normal association of religion with an 'emotional leap into belief' is not as normal as he wants us to believe. This is a Kirkegaardian view of religious belief and not 'a normal association'. Hence its particularity and context-relatedness, which would, at least, falsify the pretension that Giddens has said something substantial about 'the heart of religion' (Mehta, 1976. 29) and its universal form, let alone religious thinking.

In his more substantial work on religion and sociological classics, Giddens takes issue with the problem of pre-modern transcendentalism (and values) and modern societal needs in classical sociology. (1971. 220-222) He argues that "Durkheim's theoretical linkage between the religions of former times and the moral needs of the present *should not be allowed to gloss over*" (what Giddens thinks is the substantial and ontological difference between traditional societal configuration and contemporary societal universe) "... the equally significant divergences between traditional and contemporary society" (1971. 221).

Again here, he takes the concept of 'traditional society' as a descriptive term, as though it really there is something out there identifiable as *traditional society*. And confuses this descriptive term with his normative concept of 'modern society' and presents the latter as a descriptive term. As though, this concept is a novel invention that lives beyond history and temporal imperative.

I think what we witness here in Giddens is his own inclination, which endorses

a) the invention of secular condition, b) the perpetuation of modern condition, and c) the realization of what are 'felt' to be modern and anti-religious (meaning a religion

that would entail a vast re-extension of the realm of the sacred). (1971. 223)

In other words, he does not reveal that this is, in fact, his own utopia based on secular conception of life and the ideals distilled from this utopia are conditioned to his own history. And they do not present the universal history of mankind.

I started this intellectual engagement with Giddens from his view on history as a 'telosless' project in *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (I, II, III)*, where he stated that the structuration theory seeks "... to move away from [history] all forms of teleology save for those directly associated with individual human beings" (1995. ix). But in his *Religionkritik*, Giddens cautions us that one should not misunderstand Durkheim's engagement with religion as though nothing 'significant' occurred in history in terms of values and metaphysics. He says, if you notice that classical social theory in general and Durkheim in particular links the symbolical universe of 'pre-modern' religions to the moral needs of 'modernity', this is "... because Durkheim defines 'religion' in a broad sense which identifies it with the sacred, and thence with moral regulation in his sense, that he is able to emphasise the continuity in symbols and values while at the same time stressing the **important elements of discontinuity** between past and present" (Giddens,1971. 221).

Apart from that Giddens is mistaken in his interpretation of Durkheim in terms of theoretical linkage between religious symbolic and human morality - Durkheim's view about human nature is much closer to the idea of universal human nature and its relation to morality-, it should be remarked that Giddens is negating his own view on teleological dimension of history. Because if the history is lacking any overall dynamic form, then how is Giddens able to detect the 'significance' of *historical discontinuity*? And why is important to draw the lines between past and present if there is no overall historical forms? Why is it substantive to know about the historical discontinuity between past and present if there is no telos and nowhere collectively to head? Why does Giddens need to deprive us from teleological aspect of history but at the same time teach us about the historical motions (that would, in his view, change our morals and values)?

To say the least, it seems it would be easier to discuss these issues within a Marxian metatheory where the history still has some meaning and people still 'care' about where they go together. Because what Giddens tries to demonstrate as a reflective sociology in terms of values, morals and metatheoretical reflections are not but a derivation of his 'secular' cosmogony or *Weltbild*. Or what used to be called a secular philosophy of history, which needs to be compared with other philosophies of history. In other words, it cannot stand as the 'touchstone' of other philosophies of history but one among many which should stand in 'dialogue' with each other.

Giddens and Meta-Collective Unit of Humanity: Civilization

If one expects that Giddens has a specific field of discussion for the concept of 'civilization' and approaches him with this expectation, then he would soon or later be disappointed. However, that is not to say that Giddens' social theory and his philosophical reflections on the 'social' are devoid of any concerns whatsoever with collectivities larger than 'state', or 'nation'. For, in my view, this would not be fair to

Giddens' ceaseless engagements with various aspects of extra-national or extra-state entities such as EU, Global Village or Global Pillage. Regardless of one's agreement or disagreement with substantial aspects of Giddens' view regarding the concept of 'civilization' (or its plural reality, i.e. civilizations) two points are significantly *sine qua non* of his social theory in relation to civilizational discussions. Although both are inter-connected, and as a matter of fact as Giddens puts it one is the consequence of the other one, nevertheless one could present them as two analytically distinguished concepts. One is the concept of 'modernity' and the other one is the idea of 'subjectivity'. Giddens' discourse on 'civilization' are substantially related and conditioned by these two concepts. It seems to me that Giddens argues that one of the consequences of modernity (as a civilizational paradigm) is the birth of modern mentality, which constitutes one of the essential pillars of modern society. Below I would try very briefly explicate Giddens' views on civilizational matters and then get into a critical assessment of his substantial views on 'civilization' (in terms of modernity) and the relevance of the idea of 'subjectivity' in civilizational debates (and their impact on social-theoretical reflections).

I

Concepts such as 'capitalism', 'runaway world', 'globalization', 'cosmopolitanism', 'global village', 'global pillage' and so on are part of Giddens' social theory. (Giddens, 1999) These terms are the substantial outcome of his 'consequences of modernity-thesis' and make up the normative dimension of his civilizational understanding and orientation. (Giddens, 1990) Although there are abundant references to the concept of civilization, nevertheless what is prominent in Giddens' social theory is the idea of modernity.

One needs to reconstruct Giddens' view on civilization through his vast debates on issues such as 'Cosmopolitanism', 'Globalization', 'Fundamentalism' and the absence of other fundamental concepts such as 'civilizational subjectivity' and non-modern collective configuration. Let me now first explicate Giddens' views on 'Globalization' and 'Cosmopolitanism' and demonstrate their civilizational relevance. However, I should caution the reader that my assessments would remain very brief and selective.[¶]

[¶] For those who are interested in Giddens' (and his intellectual peers') views on normative globalism and a critique of normative globalism I would refer them to: For criticism of the claimed inevitability of nation-eroding globalism see Fred Northedge, 'Transnationalism: the American illusion', *Millennium, Journal of International Studies*, 5: 1, 1976, pp. 21-27; Kevin Cox, 'The politics of globalization: a sceptic's view', *Political Geography* 11: 1993, pp. 427-429; and Anthony D. Smith, 'Towards a global culture?', *Theory, Culture, and Society*, 7: 1990, 171-191; Anthony McGrew, 'Conceptualizing global politics' in Anthony McGrew et al., Eds. *Global Politics: Globalization and the Nation State* Cambridge: Polity, 1992), pp. 1-28, p. 23.; and David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Cambridge: Polity, 1995); Lynn Miller, *Global Order: Values and Power in International Politics*, Third Edition (Boulder: Westview, 1994); Richard Falk, *On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics* (Cambridge: Polity, 1995). Recent non-mainstream cosmopolitanism is reviewed in Heikki Patomäki, 'Emerging Late-Modern reconstructivism', *Journal of Peace Research* 31: 4, 1994, pp. 451-459. A recent article in the Rechtsstaat tradition is Waldemar Schreckenberger, 'Der moderne Verfassungsstaat und die Idee der Weltgemeinschaft', *Der Staat* 34: 4, 1995, pp. 503-526.

In demonstrating the undeniable reality of globalization Giddens resorts to one of his friends who studies village life in central Africa. "A few years ago", Giddens narrates, "she paid her first visit to a remote area where she was to carry out her fieldwork. The evening she got there, she was invited to a local home for an evening's entertainment. She expected to find out about the traditional pastimes of this isolated community. Instead, the evening turned out to be a viewing of *Basic Instinct* on video. The film at that point hadn't even reached the cinemas in London" (Giddens, 1999. Lecture 1).

This story is supposed to reveal something essential about our world and Giddens assures us that what they reveal is not a trivial issue. He argues that for better or worse, "... we are being propelled into a global order that no one fully understands, but which is making its effects felt upon all of us" (Giddens, 1999. Lecture 1.).

This story reveals that, despite what both radicals and sceptics claim, we now all live in one world. What does this mean? Giddens argues that there are intellectuals who might be viewing the true nature of 'globalism' in terms of it being a force that creates a life of 'village' or a life of 'pillage'. (Giddens, 1999) However, nobody attentive to the affairs of the world, even in the remotest area of central Africa, could deny the very presence of 'globality'.

Further, Giddens informs us that substantial aspect of his argument rests on the idea that "... globalisation today is only partly Westernisation. Of course the western nations, and more generally the industrial countries, still have far more influence over world affairs than do the poor states. But globalisation is becoming increasingly de-centred - not under the control of any group of nations, and still less of the large corporations" (Giddens, 1999).

Although it is not clear which part of globalization is tantamount to westernization, Giddens embarks on a normative and regulative formula for the global order. He discerns in the consequences of modernity "... something that has never existed before, [and that is] a global cosmopolitan society" (Giddens, 1999). Thanks to the "two great revolutions, which initiated the modern period" (Giddens, 1994. 84) we are living in a world that globality is not an option but a force driven "... by collective human will" (Giddens, 1999). Although he admits that the infrastructure of this collective will is not democratic nonetheless it is undeniable that it is "... shaking up our existing ways of life, no matter where we happen to be" (Giddens, 1999). In order to rectify its current anarchic, haphazard fashion Giddens introduces his own version of Cosmopolitanism, which is actually another way of demonstrating his own civilizational concerns.

One should agree that Giddens' cosmopolitanism is based on both philosophical and strategic reflections. Since the collapse of Soviet Union and the disintegration of Eastern Bloc post-1989 critical Left theorists have attempted to re-conceptualize the international relations vis-à-vis post-colonial realities and risks.

Seen in this context, Giddens' view on normative cosmopolitanism which he argues that "... are [based on the universal values] emerging today" (Giddens, 1994. 253) should be seen in relation to other 'normativity' and 'subjectivity' which Giddens thinks either are 'dangerous' or lack any substantial concerns for 'dialogue'. In other words, his philosophically-oriented political civilizational theory is situated within the

tradition of normative globalism or political cosmopolitanism a la David Held's *Democracy and the Global Order* (1995), Richard Falk's *Humane Governance* (1995), and Lynn Miller's *Global Order* (1994), just mention a few from a long tradition.

Giddens sees that opposition to this branch of globalism tantamount to non-dialogical discourse. Hence, his view on fundamentalism as 'problematic'. Giddens thinks that it is " ... edged with the possibility of violence, and it is the enemy of cosmopolitan dialogue" (Giddens, 1999. Lecture 3).

Although it is of importance to note that he equates any concerns with so-called pre-modern philosophies and worldviews as 'fundamentalist' and 'traditionalist' nevertheless he holds that globalization is somehow related to westernization. What Giddens is not revealing is in what aspect, say, Islamic or Pan-African discourses defy globalism? I don't want to run ahead than my next step but it is necessary to mention that Giddens admits that the globalism is a mixture of westernism (an abbreviation for modern subjectivity) and globalism (a short name for an historical process). But at the same time he does not grant any 'authenticity' on people or traditions, which choose to 'regard' something as 'westernism' and the other as 'globalism' based on their own tradition and subjectivity.

That is to say, Giddens tells the story based on his own modern subjectivity but at the same time depicts the end of the story again based on his own subjectivity. And whoever refuses to accept or comply with this frame of normative globalism Giddens would call them fundamentalist. And that is why he suggests that " ... fundamentalism ... can be understood exactly as a refusal of dialogue ..." (Giddens, 1994. 124).

In other words, Giddens' engagements with civilizational issues are embedded within his social theory and are expressed and couched in a normative language. It will be more obvious what he means and where he heads when one considers who are the foes or adversaries of his 'global cosmopolitanism'. (1994. 252) Because, as Andy Blunden rightly points, it is not always clear with Giddens when it comes to what he says is a *description* of social processes, or he is *advocating* for those processes (Blunden, 2000. Giddens' Ethics) and maybe this is why he is very popular and considered as a progressive sociologist.

II

As I stated earlier, a critique needs a critic. And a critic is a person who adjudicates in accordance to a position. Etymologically speaking, the term 'critic' (*kritēs*) meant a sense of 'inquired judgment' as performed by a judge in a very considerable manner. However, it meant a judgment based on external factors and the insightful adjudication of the person of *kritēs*. In other words, the very doing of judgment is based on a dual process, which has a substantial element of 'subjectivity' but is not divorced from objective realm. That is to say, although we all do sociology that does not necessarily mean that we all share the same 'position' or 'subjectivity'. In other words, my critique is not performed in terms of if his global cosmopolitanism is more preferable to Held's liberal cosmopolitanism (see: *Globalization, Cosmopolitanism and Democracy: an interview with David Held by Montserrat Guibernau.*). Because there are, in my view, plenty of dialogue and debates in those terms. What is needed is not a more dialogue in that regard but in other direction.

My own position is right where Giddens calls fundamentalism and considers its very substantial fundament as 'anti-dialogical'. (Giddens, 1994. 124) And his own position on fundamentalism is one of non-dialogue. Because, Giddens argues (1999. Lecture 3), that fundamentalism due to its traditional defence of tradition, is the enemy of cosmopolitan dialogue.

Let's go back right to where we started our dialogue with Giddens on civilizational issues. In the outset of my discussion on Giddens I quoted him where he narrated a story about his friend who wanted to study the village life in central Africa. When she arrived there and wished to 'observe' the traditional pastimes of this isolated community, she found unexpectedly that the members of this isolated community are watching Basic Instinct on video.

Let's deconstruct this story, which Giddens told us as a matter of example that would reveal the fact of globalization and the necessity of his version of global cosmopolitanism (which is partially embedded in westernization). What he calls 'Central Africa' is actually consisted of a) Democratic Republic of the Congo, b) Chad, c) Central African Republic, d) Republic of the Congo, and e) Cameroon. A closer look at the history of these nascent nation-states would reveal that all of them were part of Western colonialism and did not have any independent position, either intellectually or institutionally, to explicate and establish their own 'subjectivity'. That is to say, his naïve social anthropology does not reveal the problem and to me what this story reveals is not the need for a global cosmopolitanism. On the contrary, it reminds us how deep and continuing colonialism is.

The lack of political economic analysis in Giddens dis-informs his civilizational orientations and makes him to either disregard the causes of African lack of native subjectivity or distort other active subjectivity such as Chinese Communism or Islamic Revivalism.

What Giddens calls 'Global Cosmopolitanism' is a more sophisticated and informed elaboration of the discourse of modernity. I think the discourse of modernity, despite all its varieties and its critics, is a secular faith in how the universe of man functions. It (modernity) is the subjectivity of modern man and modern civilization. In deconstructing Giddens' views on globalization and cosmopolitanism one is faced with a very profound reality and that is the 'facelessness' of other civilizations or cultures wherever they are encountered by global forces.

In *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics* (1994), Giddens argues that the modern social order came into being in the context of a break with the past. The 'two great revolutions', which initiated the modern period each in their way, were detraditionalizing forces. (1994. 84) If these assumed revolutions were of a detraditionalizing characters in Western Europe that does not necessarily mean that the same should happen all over the world.

To me, it seems Giddens using these two revolutions as normative paradigm not just as historical processes, which were described by historians. And then he turns to fundamentalists and argues that in the context of dialogic democracies these forces are reactionaries. For, in Giddens' view, the fundamentalists are refusing to get into the

process of dialogue. (1994. 117-133)

But I think Giddens is mistaken in his assessments of fundamentalist and traditionalist discourses. I have two reasons for my claim. One is related to the very idea of 'tradition' (which I have already set it out in my previous discussion) and the other is related to what fundamentalists actually refuse. Let me explain myself.

What Giddens terms as tradition and what he considers as traditionalist are more of fiction than scholarly discussions aimed at dialogically opening different vistas for intercivilizational co-operation and solidarity. Moreover the concept of 'tradition' in Giddens lacks conceptual sophistication. The concept of 'tradition' is not as naively conceived and employed by traditionalists as Giddens reports. In other words, traditionalists are not as unreasonable as Giddens depicts them for us.

Giddens confuses modernity (which is a state of mind) with 'contemporariness' (which is a feature of external reality). The traditionalist writers such as Frithjof Schuon (1907-1998), Kenneth Oldmeadow, Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, or Seyyed Naqib al-Attas do distinguish between the terms 'contemporary' and 'modern'. The former designating that, which is of the present age, be it traditional or modern, and the latter, in contrast to Tradition, designating that which is cut off from the Transcendent. (Nasr Seyyed Hossein, 1990, Al-Attas Seyyed M. Naquib, 1995.)

In other words, I don't think Giddens meets the traditionalists on their own terms or at the same level of engagement. His view of tradition obstructs him to approach other forms of subjectivity that do not equate 'modernity' with the contemporary world.

The second point is, I think what, say, Islamic discourses claim is not a refusal of 'dialogue' as Giddens portrays. What is, on the contrary, refused is the 'regulative' or 'normative' status assigned to 'modern subjectivity'. If this subjectivity were conceived as one among others that need to negotiate its own place in the civilizational context of humanity then no danger or risk would arise. This dimension is totally absent from his civilizational concerns. And that is why whenever Giddens discusses other extra-Occidental cultures they are portrayed as faceless or their subjectivity is not explicated fully. The so-called fundamental discourses are traditional but not in the sense described by Giddens. What, say, an Islamic Traditionalist argues is not a ritual repetition of traditional dogma but is an active defending of 'Islamic Subjectivity'. After all, what is a civilization without any 'coherent subjectivity'?

Giddens and Meta-Methodology: Historiography

Conventionally, historiography is conceived as the art, or employment of, writing history. The recent philosophical and meta-theoretical revisions and revolutions had sensitized the very concept of 'history' and 'graphicing historical scene'. The very idea of history has become problematically multi-layered and the traditional divisions between 'science', 'philosophy', and 'history', if not a tale of past, at least, are not unproblematical either.

To think of history and how to 'paint' its moves and motions (and even telos) are not conceived by many possible or even desirable. In other words, to think of historiography is to conceptualize about grand narrative. And there are, right or wrong, many who oppose any kind of grand narratives in the name of grand name of

‘post-modernity’.

However, it is undeniable that even those who do not grant any meaning or telos to ‘history’, do, indeed, need to presuppose some kind of ‘signposts’ in the matrix of history. I mean, even those who think of history as a telosless deity at the end of the day feel the need to assume some ‘happenings’ in the history as ‘significant’, ‘normative’, ‘substantial’ or all three together in comparison to other ‘occurrences’. Although they might argue that these assumed norms are ‘significant’ just due to their inherent utilities in relation to the ‘individual person’, nevertheless they assume that one historically context-bounded concept of ‘individual’ is tantamount to the universal history of humanity.

In other words, to think of history is always accompanied with conceiving of ‘vision’ and ‘mission’. That is to say, to speak of history is to speak of human existence. To speak of human existence is at a certain level is to speak of contingency, and to situate man in any given manifestation is to invoke a necessary correspondence between contextuality and contingency. Regardless of recent debates on modernity versus post-modernity in terms of grand narratives, I think the axis of debate is somewhere else, i.e. between the Traditional Metaphysics and Modern (or secular) Metaphysics. The difference between the outlooks of Tradition and Modernity lies in their different orientations, which account for their different interpretations of the world. That is to say, historiography is not divorced from epistemological and existential concerns; and moreover the whole edifice of historical imagination is not conceivable without any coherent *Weltbild*. Although some within social science discourses argued that epistemological and meta-theoretical matters had damaged the growth of sociology nevertheless it is undeniable that the historiography of sociology in Giddens is not exempted of meta-theoretical issues. I will briefly explicate his historiographical views on sociology and then put my own view on his historiography of sociology.

I

In his *Capitalism and modern social theory: An analysis of the writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber* (1971), Giddens resorts to Lord Acton's vision of the birth of modern history as an act of semi-cosmological deliverance:

" Unheralded, it founded a new order of things, under a law of innovation, sapping the ancient reign of continuity. In those days Columbus subverted the notions of the world, and reversed the conditions of production, wealth, and power; in those days Machiavelli released government from the restraint of law; Erasmus diverted the current of ancient learning from profane into Christian channels; Luther broke the chain of authority and tradition at the strongest link; and Copernicus erected an invincible power that set for ever the mark of progress upon the time that was to come ... It was an awakening of new life; the world revolved in a different orbit, determined by influences unknown before" (Acton quoted in Giddens, 1971. xi).

This narrative is assumed by Giddens as a guideline in order to set the authentic historical imaginal backbone of modern social theory. This story is supposed to present the essential characteristic of modern view of life from the traditional society. (Giddens, 1971. xi) Because the post-Renaissance worldview brought something new into the European mind and the collection of all what Acton described above is

nothing but the birth of modern subjectivity.

Giddens seizes upon this idea and argues that if " ... [R]enaissance Europe gave rise to a concern with history, it was industrial Europe which provided the conditions for the emergence of sociology" (Giddens, 1971. xi) The reasons for this emergence are twofold: the first one is related to the meta-theoretical dimension of social theory based on naturalism (Giddens, 1979. 8), and the second one is the contextual matrix of sociology, i.e. the modern social order brought about by the 'two great revolutions'. (Giddens, 1994. 84)

In other words, to draw the imaginary historiographical parameters of sociology, one needs to explicate the contours of modern subjectivity. That is to say, the emergence of sociology cannot be possible with a transcendental philosophy of science that does not exclude the natural order but subsumes it in the order of things.

The sociological reasoning is scaffolded upon what C. Wright Mills called 'sociological imagination'. The contours of this imagination are patterned by Giddens on the modern history of Europe where " ... past has become, in some degree, a burden from which men seek to be freed" (Giddens, 1971. xi). The striking point in Lord Acton's historiography, where Giddens situates it at the outset of his sociological historiography is its comprehensiveness. The story includes all aspects of life: the external and internal dimensions of universe of Man.

In other words, in this narrative the interior life of man and all his attributes are included within the same plot. And the origin of everything newly 'ordered' is detected and related to the 'source of origin': Europe. More importantly, Acton narrates that the underlying spirit is not to be found in its external glory or discoveries. On the contrary, the most important aspect of this new era, where sociology's history and mode of inquiry began, is its " ... awakening of new life" (Acton quoted in Giddens, 1971. xi).

The history of sociology in this account is related by Giddens substantially to this mode of life. And this is nothing less than a Cosmogony of modern thought.

II

Let me now very concisely explain myself and assess some aspects of Giddens' historiography of sociology.

Traditionally, 'Cosmogony' stands for the study of the origin and development of the universe or a theory of such an origin or evolution. What really sparked the first cosmogonical questions were questions such as "why is there anything at all?" Or "How did this set of system come into being?" and on and on. These are assumedly questions that fall within religion and mythology. But the modern science has not been regressive in this arena and as a matter of fact there are many modern cosmogonical accounts of the universe.

However, my point is not to discuss the debate between modern and pre-modern cosmographies. On the contrary, what I would like to pinpoint is that most of the cosmogonical accounts deal with the birth of the 'inanimate' universe. The point I wish to make is that within historical sociology there is a tendency towards 'cosmogony'.

By this term, I do not mean its technical use but the concerns of sociologists and historians in narrating the 'exact origins' and 'development' of the universe of modern society.

What Acton narrates and Giddens affirmatively puts at the centre of his historiographical quest (and by doing so, confines the range of historical sources which are supposed to nourish the 'Sociological Stem') is a historical theory of the birth of modern societal universe. There are good reasons to doubt the viability of this Actonian theory of origin or what I call modern book of *genesis*. Among many reasons, one can mention the falsity of 'abruptness theory'. The modern epoch, argues Acton (and this is what Giddens holds too), did not succeed the mediaeval era by normal succession, with outward tokens of legitimate descent. (Acton, 1960. 19) The relation between mediaeval Europe and Renaissance was far more complicated than this Victorian narrative.

Moreover and more important to my discussion is the result that Giddens wishes to infer from this narrative. There is no way to prove that the forces which brought the new order of things were all brought about by 'Columbus', 'Machiavelli', 'Erasmus', 'Luther', 'Copernicus' and etc. in the 'fashion' told us by these modern historians. Giddens is not aware of the presentist dangers embedded in this historiography. However, I think what he is more interested in is not to be historically correct. On the contrary, he is looking for something more vital in the constitution of social life and that is the idea of 'subjectivity'.

What Acton narrates does not have any coherent historical credibility but that does not minimize its credential as a 'good story'. Because I think a good story is not always a true story. As a matter of fact most good stories are not concerned with 'truthfulness' in secular scientific sense. For example, the myth of creation of the World in African Cosmogony (in the story of Bumba told by Central Bantu Tribe of the Lunda Cluster) is not telling about the 'atoms' or 'physical particles'. But it is certainly narrating something essential about the sensibility and life as human beings:

"When at last the work of creation was finished, Bumba walked through the peaceful villages and said to the people, 'behold these wonders [life, trees, nature and etc.]. They belong to you.' Thus from Bumba, the Creator, the First Ancestor, came forth all the wonders that we see and hold and use, and all the brotherhood of beasts and man" (Leach, 1956. 145-6).

What the significant point is in Giddens' Actonian narrative is the formulation of 'Modern Subjectivity'. Giddens' historiographical account is important, not in terms of *wie es eigentlich gewesen*, but in terms of presenting the contours and substantial dimensions of modern subjectivity. What Giddens introduces as the historical background of sociology is not the only valid historical background but the one, which is based on modern subjectivity. This is an important fact which when related to Giddens' civilizational and political views (such as normative globalism and cosmopolitanism versus fundamentalism) would open an apt dialogical avenue for remoulding the parameters of academic sociology upon multi-civilizational dimensions.

The other significant point in this Actonian narrative that Giddens wish to infer a substantial historiographical conclusion is the idea of 'break'. Although it is not clear

from this account what are the features of this modern break nevertheless it is not hard to imagine that this 'break' is foremost of a metaphysical character. Again here this point could be pursued in two distinct ways. One could assess the credibility of modern 'break' as an intellectual option or on the other hand one could look at the 'universal' character of this 'modern paradigm'. Here I would like to look at the second option very briefly in connection to other civilizational units in the light of Giddens' cosmopolitanism - which is inferred from his historical view on the paradigmaticity of modern subjectivity.

Let's assume that Europe broke with her past in order to enter the realm of modernity that does not necessarily entail that other civilizational units need to do the same in order to reinvent their dynamic civilizational forces for progress. Looking at Giddens' cosmopolitanism, which is based on his modern subjectivity, one gets the feeling that he is over-anxious about the political assertion of other 'civilizational subjectivity' that does not share the same cosmogonical universe of the social. Giddens goes as far as to call all, what he calls fundamentalism, fundamentally different subjectivities 'enemies of the global cosmopolitanism'. (Giddens, 1999. BBC Lectures)

In other words, sociology needs to recover the rich of human history and all forces that are substantially vital in the 'awakening of life'. The story of 'Renaissance', 'French Revolution', 'Scientific Revolution', and 'The Birth of Nationalism' are normative signposts and substantial occurrences within the psyche of modern subjectivity. And the story of sociology told in these terms is the story of social reflections in the realm of this subjectivity. I wish not to belittle this story because there are many who do 'believe' in this story and interpret their own ethos in terms of this story. But the project of sociology cannot be fulfilled in monological terms.

In other words, the normative signposts of, say, Hindu or Islamic discourse are not 'French Revolution', or 'Industrial Revolution'. The normative revolution of Islamic paradigm is the birth of 'Islamic Logos' and the establishment of the al-Medina City. This is the story of Muslim Subjectivity. And if now the assertion of this subjectivity on the political arena does not fit the parameters of modern subjectivity the answer is not branding one 'Global' and the other 'Enemy of the Global Cosmopolitanism' as does Giddens. The way forward is dialogue between genuine and different subjectivities. Last but not least it should be noted that, the non-modern civilizations do not need to comply with the modern subjectivity in order to adapt to the modern conditions. These are two different aspects. Because, as the Algerian thinker (Malek Ben Nabi) said once about the importance of 'original subjectivity':

"A society which does not have its own guiding ideas can make neither its consumer goods nor its equipment. It is not by means of ideas imported or imposed that a society can develop. [An original subjectivity is based on] ... intellectual originality [and through this original act] ... [one can] ... regain [original] ... independence" (Malek Ben Nabi quoted in Anwar Ibrahim, 1990. 7).

Giddens' views on sociology, social theory, world politics, and more importantly his global cosmopolitanism versus fundamentalism are based on the substantiality of modern subjectivity in adjudicating substantive issues of humanity. What he claims is that all other emerging kinds of non-modern subjectivity, if there is any at all, need to comply with his normative globalism abroad and Third Way at home. My

conversation with Giddens on all three accounts (metatheory, civilizational, and historiographical) led me to believe that there are good reasons not, as Swedes say, *Köpa Grisen I Säcken!* What I want to say is one needs to open up the black box of Giddens' sociological reflections before buying his political and normative inferences. Because it seems Giddens is deeply oblivious to the very idea of multifarious spirits of civilizations, which was aptly addressed by Chinese philosopher Ku Hung-Ming almost over a century ago. The question Giddens forgets to ask and is, on the other hand, perceptively raised by Ku Hung-Ming about the very nub of civilization is that we must not ask what great cities, what magnificent houses, what fine roads the civilization in question has built and is able to build; what beautiful and comfortable furniture, what clever and useful implements, tools and instruments it has made and is able to make; no, not even what institutions, what arts and sciences it has invented: the question we, Ku Hung-Ming argues, must ask, in order to estimate the value of a civilization, - is, *what type of humanity*, what kind of men and women it has been able to produce. In fact, the man and woman, - the type of human beings- which

... a civilization produces, it is this which shows the essence, the personality, so to speak, the soul of that civilization. (Ku Hung-Ming, 1915. 5)

Seen from Ku Hung-Ming's point of vantage then we realize that the idea of modernity which envelops the whole perspective of Giddens is in dire need of critical re-evaluation based on intercivilizational dialogue. In the coming article we shall review this aspect of Giddens based on Ku Hung-Ming's reading of civilization and the essence of civility which makes possible the birth of various human social realities.

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