THE ELECTION IN IRAQ: HOPE
AND FEAR
by A.E.
SOUAIAIA
January 2005
It is almost amusing to see
many world leaders taking credit for an Iraqi election whose
impact may not be known until the constitution is ratified
through a public referendum in less than a year. More
importantly, it must be remembered that this election was
demanded by one man: Ali al-Husayni al-Sistani. So it is on
his political and religious capital that this process is going
to be judged. We all know that if the US had its way, the
country will be governed by a hand-picked regime and the
constitution would have been drafted by a US-picked body. Last
year around this time, al-Sistani brought thousands of
Shi`ites to the streets to oppose US plan to hand over
sovereignty to some sort of Iraqi regime and entrust the task
of writing a constitution to another caucus-appointed body
approved by the US. That show of power by al-Sistani, the
revolt by another Shi`ite movement affiliated with Muqtada al-Sadr,
and the relentless attacks by the growing resistance in the
Sunni areas forced Paul Bremer to transfer limited sovereignty
to an Interim Iraqi government and allow the UN to architect
an election plan that is acceptable to al-Sistani standards
and timeline. Now we have reached that first step of
establishing a relatively legitimate government. However, this
process satisfied Shi`ite centers of power but it did not
satisfy the demands of the Sunnis. Influential Sunni political
entities were prepared to participate in an election as long
as security was guaranteed. The armed resistance on the other
hand, argued—as did al-Sadr movement before al-Sistani’s
intervention in April 2004—that there should be no election
under occupation.
As a consequence, on January
30, Iraqis participated (in various degrees of participation
depending of the geography and affiliations) in a national
election to elect representatives (a national assembly), which
will elect members of a presidential committee: one President
and two Vice-Presidents elected by at least two-third
majority. The presidential committee is then expected to
unanimously appoint a Prime Minister who will form a
government. The government must be approved by the assembly.
The elected representatives will also draft a national
constitution which will be put for a public referendum. Once
the constitution is adopted via a public vote, the assembly
will be dissolved and a new political and constitutional
process will start all over again to create the permanent
institutions of Iraq.
By the numbers, nearly 14
million people were registered to vote. These voters had the
opportunity to choose among 111 political entities. The
political entities were individuals, parties, and coalitions
of organizations. The voters did not vote for any particular
person; rather, for a political entity that was given an ID
number (ranging from 101 to 212), a name, and a slogan. Each
of these lists of political entities contained actual names of
its persons (that was unknown to the public) wherein after
each two names, there must a woman’s name in order to ensure
that regardless of which list end up winning more votes, that
list will consist of at least 25% women. When the votes are
counted, the lists will be given certain number of seats based
on their performance in the balloting process. When all is
said and done, a body of 275-member national assembly is
established. It must be noted also that during the same
election, voters also elected municipal (local) governments.
In addition to these two elections, the Kurdish voters elected
their own assembly.
This election is important not
because it produces a new government; rather, because it
produced a body that will draft a permanent constitution. In a
sense, although this assembly indirectly appoints a new
government to replace Allawi’s, the government and the
assembly will dissolve upon the ratification of the
constitution. For this reason, this election—historical as it
may—is not the only chance for any group to have a say in the
future of Iraq. This may be the last window however to end
violence and foster a spirit of civility and tolerance in that
country and end the occupation. There are a number of
scenarios that might lead to this end result.
Despite the boasting of the
high turnout of voters, clearly the Sunni areas were under
different conditions. Even if they wanted to participate, the
fact that the main political entity that might have
represented them withdrew from the race makes it impossible to
contend that the high turnout reflects Sunni participation.
Because even if they did participate; they might have chosen
from a list that did not include their real choice. Moreover,
since the vote was one that treated the entire country as one
district (for the national assembly vote), it is not possible
to have a runoff election just in Sunni areas in a later date.
It is possible, however, that
the political entity that ends up controlling the assembly and
the government invite Sunni representatives to participate in
the process. The success of such a gesture will depend on how
the new government and assembly handle the security situation
and the presence of the American troops. If some of the
resistance factions are co-opted in the new security forces,
enough Sunni representative participate in drafting of the
constitution, and UN peace keepers made out in part at least
of Muslim troops are invited to replace the coalition forces;
Iraq could emerge from chaos very fast. The inclusion of Sunni
representatives may sound arbitrary and non-democratic; but
with broad consultation that will lead to real representation,
it is hard for the Sunnis to continue a self-imposed political
paralysis. After all, in one year, a new election will take
place and they can have their say through the ballot then too.
If the results of this
election are treated as to legitimize the rule of a new
political entity to the exclusion of Sunni provinces, it is
very possible that a civil war will take place and will result
in the breakup of Iraq. If the independent commission and the
observers certify that the election was fair and legitimate,
it remains the case that Sunni communities were not under the
same conditions as the Shi`ites and the Kurds during this
election; and that by itself is enough of a reason for the
Sunnis to question the mandate of the election.
No matter what the results
are, this new government that will emerge from this long
process will be the first government that was not picked by
the US. The actual numbers will determine what kind of
government the US will have to deal with but if this
guess-work initial numbers put forth by members of the
election commission are correct, it seems that not only Sunnis
have boycotted the election but possibly so did the followers
of Muqtada al-Sadr. If that is the case, that means that Kurds
and Allawi’s list will receive more than expected votes; votes
that do not reflect their actual political capital. This would
force the top winners to resort to deal-making. Nonetheless,
even if al-Sistani’s list wins a simple majority, it is highly
possible that they will demand an end to occupation in order
to deflate the resistance and entice more Sunnis to join in.
There is a
window of opportunity for all involved. In fact, this may be
the last chance for the US and the future Iraqi government to
get things done and do them properly. Neither party can be
greedy however. In the short run, the US may end up with less
than what it hoped for. But with all the blunders such as the
torture of Iraqi prisoners in the hands of US troops, the UK
torture of detainees in the south of Iraq, the absence of all
forms of weapons of mass destruction that pretexted the
invasion in the first place; the only venue that might restore
American moral authority is to allow any form of government
and constitution to emerge in Iraq. Alternatively, the US
could impose its will on the new regime and decide to maintain
its military and political dominance; if that were to happen,
the military conflict will persist, Iraq will certainly be
divided, the US troops will retreat to the Kurdish areas, and
the US will find itself in another South Korea-North Korea or
Eastern Germany-Western Germany kind of arrangement except
that it will be more hostile and more tense one.
Professor A. E. SOUAIAIA
teaches at the UI.
