Deconstructing
Iraq
by Rannie Amiri
November 2004
Understanding United States'
intentions in post-war Iraq really requires little more than a
basic knowledge of what caused it, Europe, and numerous Arab
countries to first sustain the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein:
stemming the influence of the Iranian revolution which deposed an
American-installed ruler and was potentially set to agitate Shi'a
co-religionists in neighboring Iraq, and Muslims elsewhere, to do
likewise.
It is my contention that the same set of perceived fears which
made Saddam such an attractive ally then are also present today.
Iran, and its ability to become a regional nuclear power, is again
regarded as the primary threat. A Shi'a dominated government
ruling Iraq is set to come forth as Arab Sunnis do their best to
circumvent this inevitability.
To better appreciate these issues, it is important to recognize
the centuries-old modus operandi of Ottoman, British, and French
imperialism in the Middle East. This was simply to let the
minority govern the majority. Forcing the minority to depend on
the colonialist to remain in power gave the latter a free hand to
dictate policy. The discrepancy taken advantage of in Iraq was
obvious. There, the Arab Shi'a form at least 60% of the population
and have never held power, while the Arab Sunnis constitute at
most 20% and have always done so. The present situation, though,
makes it impossible for the U.S. to follow the old colonialist
model and install a new Sunni strongman. Instead, they have chosen
the next best option: Iraq's deconstruction and eventual
dissolution.
The examples in support of this are plentiful.
First and most obvious is how only a pathetically small portion of
the $18 billion allocated over a year ago by Congress has been
spent. Much of the country still remains without regular
electricity, clean water, or sewage disposal. Iraq's public
health system is in tatters. As reported by the Washington Post,
infant mortality has increased dramatically since the war
concluded and currently 400,000 children suffer from profound
malnourishment. Even so, some of these monies are being diverted
for military purposes at the same time Iraqi revenue is siphoned
off and awarded to Halliburton or its subsidiaries in the form of
no-bid contracts.
Second, despite the perceived ineptness of the Coalition Provision
Authority, they were shrewd enough to ensure lawlessness ruled in
the war's aftermath. This was accomplished by disbanding the Iraqi
army.
Ostensibly done for being populated with Ba’athists and Saddam
loyalists, everyone knew this was shallow pretext as it only
applied to commissioned officers. The vast bulk of the 350,000
conscripted soldiers were reflective of the majority of Iraq's
population, the Shi'a. Were it to come under leadership from the
same group, the U.S. believed it would not only have little
influence over it, but more importantly, there would be a large,
armed force present to maintain order. This was unacceptable of
course. The widespread scenes of looting and anarchy were exactly
the images the U.S. wanted the world to behold. Without the
appearance of disorder and chaos, it is more difficult to justify
indefinite occupation.
The primary, and probably most easily exploited, of all means
whereby Iraq is to be rendered a powerless nation is one that
follows the second golden rule of colonialism, divide and conquer.
In this case, it is the desire to facilitate its partition into
three regions along religious and ethnic lines.
The Kurds have always hinted at or threatened secession. For all
practical purposes, they already have an autonomous enclave.
Schisms between Iraq's Arab Sunni and Shi'a communities have
quickly surfaced as evidenced by their reaction to the assault on
Fallujah and stance on upcoming elections.
A conglomeration of Islamists, pan-Arabists, and even those Sunnis
in the Iraqi government such as Interim President Ghazi al-Yawar
condemned the Fallujah offensive, while other figures such as
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who commands the loyalty of Iraq's
15 million Shi'a, have remained silent. The opposite was true when
Najaf was besieged several months ago.
The question which begs asking, however, is why did the U.S.
willingly permit former Ba'athist army officers affiliated with
Saddam's old regime, in the form of the "Fallujah Brigades," to
assume control of the city in April? Then, after months of
hostage taking, beheadings, suicide car bombings, and the murder
of hundreds of Iraqi National Guardsmen and police, why wait so
long before initiating the (well-telegraphed) attack? Was it to
allow the groups operating there and in elsewhere in the Sunni
Triangle to freely underscore and exacerbate sectarian divisions
and differences for as long as possible?
There have been calls by all eight Sunni political parties in
Iraq, including the main Iraqi Islamic Party, to boycott the
January 2005 elections to the National Assembly unless they are
postponed for six months due to the unrest. Should this occur, any
vote would leave the parliament's legitimacy in question. Demands
of Iraq's Shi'a to hold elections as stipulated by the interim
constitution on January 30, however, are loud. As of this writing,
not a single Shi'a political party has joined the call to delay
them. Brutalized under Saddam and marginalized for centuries, it
will be no small measure to convince them that this is not just
another attempt to do the same.
The groundwork has thus been laid for a divided, sectarian,
flaccid nation to emerge. I believe the U.S. will eventually
propose to the United Nations that Iraq be divided into three
zones - Shi’a Arab, Sunni Arab, and Kurdish - or face continued
discord and instability. While the world may well regard this as a
miserable failure, the U.S. will have only one word to describe
the outcome achieved in the pursuit of a weakened, deconstructed
Iraq.
Success.
Rannie Amiri is an independent observer, commentator, and exponent
of issues dealing with the Arab and Islamic worlds.
