Rannie Amiri
The United States is quickly finding itself sinking into an ever deepening quagmire in the post-war occupation of Iraq. Ironically, the Bush administration is doing its level best to alienate the one group in Iraq that can prevent them from ultimately going under: the Arab Iraqi Shia.
The Iraqi Shia are long accustomed to having few, if any friends, in the Middle East. Indeed, one can say this about the Arab Shia population as a whole. Long oppressed and vilified by the ruling Sunni elite, they are now the recipients of a modicum of political respect in Lebanon, where they constitute a non-plural majority. There, they have earned the admiration of their countrymen for stiff resistance and ultimate victory over Israeli occupation in the south. Likewise, the Shia have enjoyed more political rights and freedoms in Kuwait after fighting in the 1991 Gulf War with fellow Kuwaitis, which adequately demonstrated an always doubted loyalty to the country. The Shia still languish under severe Wahabi religious persecution in Saudi Arabia, and their lot seems only marginally improved in the tiny island nation of Bahrain, where they are a majority.
The Iraqi Shia are unique, however, in that they are the only Shia Muslims among the Arab countries where they form an absolute majority (sixty percent) in a nation with a sizable population (twenty-four million).
One would think the United States would go out of its way to court this demographic: a long victimized, anti-Ba’athist, anti-Wahabi majority who welcomed the removal of Saddam Hussein and his mafia, responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of their people. Unfortunately, this has not been the case.
Prior to the 1991 Gulf War, the seeds of mistrust were sewn when the U.S. provided Saddam Hussein with chemical and biological weapons in its war against Iran, with the full knowledge that these weapons were tested by Saddam against his Kurdish and Shia citizens. A more specific illustration, however, occurred in the immediate aftermath of this war.
At that time, President George H.W. Bush called upon the Iraqi people to “rise up, and take matters into their own hands against Saddam Hussein, the dictator”. The Iraqi Shia heeded his call, and were surprisingly successful in routing the Ba’athists. At one point, fifteen of Iraq’s nineteen provinces were in full control of the rebels. However, when Saddam used his fixed-wing aircraft to combat the revolt, the United States did nothing to intervene, and nearly 200,000 Iraqis were massacred. Using the pretext that the only stated goal under the United Nations mandate was the liberation of Kuwait, the Americans idly by and watched as the Shia were hunted down and systemically killed.
The Shia never forgot this American betrayal.
The real reason for U.S. passivity in the wake of this genocide was quite clear. They simply did not want Saddam Hussein to be toppled. The U.S. (wrongly) feared that the Iraqi Shia, if successful in their rebellion, would set up an Islamic state similar to the one in neighboring Iran. There were the secondary considerations of placating their allies Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. If Saddam adequately contained the Kurds, they wouldn’t pose any threat to Turkey, which finds the mere mention of Kurdish autonomy repugnant. The Saudis would not object to Saddam stifling any Iraqi Shia aspirations, as they are quite suspicious of their own Shia minority located in the Eastern Province (in addition to their possible agitation by neighboring Iran). Israel of course, could not be made to feel vulnerable under any circumstance, even Scud missiles filled with concrete hitting Israel, which Saddam used against them in this conflict.
Now we jump to Friday, August 29, 2003. This was one of the greatest single-day tragedies for the Iraqi Shia since the crushing of the 1991 uprising. The assassination of one of its most respected religious figures, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir Al-Hakim, took place in the holy city of Najaf, along with nearly 125 other worshipers, when a car bomb exploded outside the Imam Ali mosque.
After returning from 23 years of exile in Iran, Ayatollah Al-Hakim’s message was one of moderation. He told his followers to cooperate with the Americans despite their past empty promises, but to never forget they are the occupiers of Iraq, and eventually must depart. He did not advocate a religious theocracy, as some claimed, despite the name of the organization he led, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. He correctly realized that the religious and ethnic landscape of Iraq does not make it amenable to such a system, unlike neighboring Iran. Although he commanded a 10,000 man strong army, the Badr Brigades, he did not set them against the United States, or anyone else for that matter. In fact, he asked them to lay down their arms in deference to the coalition troops.
The United States had an ideal friend in Ayatollah Al-Hakim. A moderate, respected religious figure, who commanded the loyalty of a significant portion of the Iraqi Shia. His assassination was no doubt orchestrated by Wahabi extremists, probably with the cooperation of Ba’athists, to further their similar agendas of making Iraq as chaotic as possible and fomenting dissent.
In delivering his brother's eulogy, however, Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim (also one of the members of Iraq’s ruling Governing Council), did not put the onus on either the Wahabis or the Ba’athists. Instead, he put the blame of his brothers' assassination squarely on the shoulders of the U.S. As the occupying power, they failed to provide adequate security to the occupied. Specifically, security for those people who were among the first to welcome the U.S. troops toppling the tyrant of Iraq. Security to those who lived under the yolk of Saddam's despotism, losing tens of thousands of their best men, women, and children in opposing him and his American and Israeli-made weapons. All of this while their Arab neighbors were remained shamefully silent, and long before the U.S. feigned sympathy for their plight. Once again, the Shia felt betrayed.
The question remains. Why has the U.S. has done so little to build bridges of friendship and trust with the Iraqi Shia?
Is it because of their perceived, albeit misguided, notion that they will join forces with Iran and spread Islamic revolution throughout the Middle East? No. The Iraqi Shia are quite nationalistic. In addition, they have always felt the proper seat of Shia religious thought to be in Najaf, not Qum, where it has been since Saddam Hussein took power and either executed or expelled the Iraqi Shia religious leaders to Iran. The Iranians too, are becoming more nationalistic in their outlook than they were at the time of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who had a more pan-Islamic vision.
Is it to please Saudi Arabia as in 1991? Clearly not. The U.S. has distanced itself from Saudi Arabia since the events of 9/11, and no longer finds it a convenient ally. American troops are now moving to more friendly territory, such as Qatar. Also, its oil supplies are guaranteed and secured through Iraqi occupation.
Before answering this question, we should first say the United States is fully aware of Shia history, which is centered on the struggles of the Imams Ali, cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, and Hussain, the son of Ali. Imam Hussain, with seventy-two of his companions, family, and children, were martyred in a most heroic fashion on the plains of Kerbala, Iraq, in 680 A.D. This battle, known as the tragedy of Kerbala, was fought against the overwhelming superiority of the army of the corrupt Umayyad caliphate. The narrative of this battle is recited yearly to this day, and therefore is always fresh in the hearts and minds of the people. It serves as THE paradigm of Shia religious thought, reflecting self-sacrifice and the acceptance of martyrdom in the face of certain defeat. The Americans know what power the story of Imam Hussain's martyrdom at Kerbala can have on the masses in resisting a new perceived enemy.
Furthermore, and maybe even more importantly, the United States is conscious of the success of Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shia resistance movement, who made the lives of Israeli soldiers occupying Lebanon exquisitely painful and ultimately caused their retreat to Israel. If they could do this to the country with the fourth largest army in the world, is there any reason this couldn't happen to one of the largest in a much bigger country?
With this in mind, one can only conclude that the United States has
distanced themselves from the Iraqi Shia - despite all their advantages as an ally against the remnants of the former regime and new ones being recruited by al-Qaeda - because they are alone in their ability to end U.S. occupation almost overnight. Losing a few soldiers every day in Ramadi, Tirkit, or Fallujah would be child's play compared to what would occur should the Shia become frustrated with the occupation. The same fear which the above mentioned scenarios hold for the United States has prevented them from fostering positive relationships with Iraq Shia populace as a whole. This is ironic, because doing just that will prevent any such revolt from occurring.
The Iraqi Shia have always felt disenfranchised politically, economically, and socially, even before the Ba'athist coup. Afterwards, they became the victims of mass killings and their religious leaders quietly murdered. They have been uprooted from their homes by Saddam’s regime by drainage of the marshes in southern Iraq, expulsion into Iran, or through transfer north to "Arabicize" the Kurdish lands. They are also quite mindful of the fact there are no Sunni Arab mass graves to be found in Iraq.
There is an Arabic proverb which says “when you are the anvil be patient, and when you are the hammer, make it hurt.” The Iraqi Shia are accustomed to being the anvil, and are now in a position to be the hammer. If the United States does not tread lightly, and appreciate and recognize the Shia are their most important constituency in Iraq at this time, the consequences will be dire. The United States must rid itself of notions as to how to successful occupy Iraq long-term, monopolize its natural resources, and set up a powerless, puppet government a la Karzai. It needs to sincerely relinquish control to the Iraqi people, and let them be the masters of their own destiny. If they do this properly and justly, they are ensured a genuine ally and peace in the country.
The U.S. should have been mindful of the symbolic nature of the red banners and flags that were seen waving during the funeral of Ayatollah Al-Hakim: his blood has yet to be avenged. Let us hope the United States changes its ways in Iraq and quickly, or they will soon find themselves to be the recipient of that holy pledge.
Rannie Amiri is an observer, commentator and exponent of issues dealing with the Arab and Islamic worlds.
