Although yet to be featured on
Ripley's Believe It or Not!, United States occupation forces will
readily testify to its existence: an Iraqi Bermuda Triangle. It is
an area where the overwhelming majority of American troops have been
attacked or killed since the official end of war was declared May
1st, whether on routine foot patrol or flying Black Hawk and Chinook
helicopters. Mysterious powers seem to be at work in this territory,
rendering its inhabitants emboldened enough to launch an early
morning rocket salvo on the fortified Al-Rashid Hotel, rousing a
sleepy-eyed Paul Wolfowitz from his smug neo-colonialist slumber.
Needless to say, it was not the type of room service he was
expecting
This foreboding enclave, which has
only brought ill-will, death and destruction to American soldiers
and all Iraqis who chose to align themselves with them, has been
dubbed "The Sunni Triangle." It is defined by the cities of Baghdad,
Tikrit to the north, and Fallujah to the west.
The party line in Washington and of
Iraq's surrogate governor, Paul Bremer, has been to blame the
violence inside and outside the Sunni Triangle on remnants of the
Ba'ath regime, the so-called "dead-enders." This nebulous
designation apparently includes high-ranking Ba'ath officials, such
as former Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council Izzat
Ibrahim al-Douri, Saddam Hussein himself, unemployed, disgruntled
mid-level Ba'ath party members, and the paramilitary Fedayeen
Saddam. Thrown into this mix of possible culprits have been ordinary
Iraqi citizens, and al-Qaida's foreign operatives.
The Ba'athists, al-Qaida, and Iraqi
civilians each have their own motivation for resisting the
occupation. The Ba'athists obviously have no realistic future in any
type of future government and thus will spare no means in combating
Coalition forces and their Iraqi hosts. Al-Qaida's imported fighters
have found new, fertile ground in the chaotic post-war Iraqi climate
to launch suicide assaults on the "infidel crusaders." The civilian
population in the Sunni Triangle also has their reasons to despise
the occupation. Because Saddam Hussein and many upper level
Ba'athists trace their roots there, random house searches, endless
interrogations and indefinite detentions of large numbers of men are
commonplace, breeding resentment. Indeed, the most vehement and
virulent demonstrations against the occupation come from Iraq's
Sunni Arabs.
These are superficial, albeit
correct, explanations of the current bloodshed. There is a deeper
causality however, which belies why if Sunni Arabs make up only 20%
of the entire Iraqi population, such a vastly disproportionate
number of hostile American and international causalities have
occurred almost exclusively at their hands.
This requires an appreciation of
general Iraqi Sunni Arab apprehension in post-war Iraq, causing
them to support Ba'athist and al-Qaida elements within the country.
In fact, if the United States had performed only a cursory review of
Iraqi history, they would have correctly predicted a restive Iraqi
Sunni Arab population as the principal cause of present-day unrest.
From shortly after the death of the
cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, Imam Ali ibn Abi
Taleb (from whom the Shia branch of Islam gets its inspiration),
Iraq has been ruled by Sunnis. The Ummayyad and Abbasid Caliphates
succeeded Imam Ali, and thereafter the Sunni Ottoman Empire until
World War I. The post-WWI monarchy in Iraq was Sunni, as was the
line of Iraqi dictators which replaced it, leading to Saddam Hussein
himself. Thus, for the last 1400 years, Arab or non-Arab Sunnis have
always been in control of Iraq.
Now, for the first time in Iraq's
history since the death of Imam Ali, the possibility exists that the
nation may be ruled by those who form an absolute majority, yet have
never actually held power: the Arab Shia. Not only would this be a
first for Iraq, but indeed for any country in the Arab world.
Saddam Hussein himself was very
cunning in polarizing the Sunni and Shia communities in Iraq. This
was done by stoking the fears of the minority Arab Sunnis, and
thereafter placing them in all spheres of his government. He quite
shrewdly made them believe their survival was entirely dependent
upon the enforcement and maintenance of his rule.
Realizing they could become victims
of retribution meted out for this manufactured support of Saddam's
regime, undermining any political system which would allow power to
be redistributed is now a primary objective for Iraq's Arab Sunnis.
Wahabi al-Qaida, historically anti-Shia, are quite frightened of the
potential of two large Shia majority states in Iran and Iraq sharing
a friendly border. Thus, they have found natural allies in the Iraqi
Sunni heartland.
One way to quell the current
violence, especially in the Sunni Triangle, is to dispel these
perceptions of fear and insecurity prevalent among ordinary Iraqi
Sunni Arabs. This would then obviate their need to make alliances
with the Ba'athists or al-Qaida. A first step would be allowing free
elections, permitting the population to independently select the
members of the Iraqi Governing Council. Today, Iraqis have little faith in this
appointed Council to fulfill the ambitions and aspirations of their
communities, let alone Iraq as a whole.
As in Lebanon, a system of sectarian
proportionality may ultimately prove to be the appropriate
transition to a more stable government. In such a system, Iraqi Arab
Shia, Sunni, Christian and Kurd would all have a literal and
figurative seat at the governing table. A platform for addressing
each group’s mutual fears and concerns can then be established.
Until that time, Iraq's Bermuda
Triangle will likely continue to expand, stemming from a
shortsighted American historical vision, and wreaking havoc on all
occupation forces who dare to venture within.
Believe it, or not.
Rannie Amiri is an observer, commentator, and exponent of issues dealing with the Arab and Islamic worlds.
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